Capital Formation and Economic Growth by Thomas C. Cochran
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Capital Formation and Economic Growth
Volume Author/Editor: Universities-National Bureau




Chapter Title: The Entrepreneur in American Capital Formation
Chapter Author: Thomas C. Cochran
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1308
Chapter pages in book: (p. 337 - 394)THE ENTREPRENEUR
IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
THOMAS C. COCHRAN
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
ON THE BASIS of present historical materials, it is impossible to treat
statistically the historical effect of entrepreneurs on capital formation
in the United States. The most that the historian can do is to indicate
some of the general outlines of entrepreneurial development, call
attention to additional material that might be investigated more
carefully, and suggest some relevant factors that have not in the
past been much considered by theoretical economists.
Problems regarding the entrepreneur in capital formation do not
differ greatly from those in general economic growth. This statement
rests upon a definition of the entrepreneur as one who makes the
sequence of decisions necessary for organizing and carrying on the
supply of goods or services for profit. Such a definition may include
members of boards of directors, salaried managers, and nonemploy-
ing business proprietors. It conceives of entrepreneurs as a broad
social group employed in administering business, most of whose basic
decisions are concerned with the allocation and use of capital. As
generally defined in terms of increasing national product or real
per capita income, economic growth also depends largely upon
allocation and use of capital.
Kuznets has suggested six major questions around which the
historico-statistical record of economic growth can be analyzed.'
Four of his categories are concerned with (1) the precise composi-
tion of the industrial process, (2) the adjustment of the labor force,
(3) the obtaining of requisite material and technological means,
and (4) the disposition of the industrial products. The present dis-
cussion will be focused on the areas indicated in his two remaining
questions: (5) "How was the expansion financed?—with particular
reference to the sources of savings that financed accumulation of
capital and the mechanisms that were evolved both to mobilize
savings and to direct them into proper investment channels"; and
The author is indebted for suggestions and criticisms to Arthur H. Cole,
Leland H. Jenks, and others at the Research Center for Entrepreneurial History
at Harvard; Moses Abramovitz; Simon Kuznets; and Harold F. Williamson.
1Problenuin the Study of Economic Growth, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Special Conference Series, No. 1, mimeographed, 1949, p. 12.
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(6)"Who were the active agents of industrialization—the carriers
of technological change and the spearheads in the institutional and
economic breaks that were the indispensable prerequisite and ac-
companiment of the industrial process—and what was their role
in the conflicts that the impact of industrialization created within
the economy?"
As Kuznets goes on to say, "Clearly each of the broad questions
comprises a host of others." Leland Jenks holds that a general theory
of society—specifically, some sort of sociology of change—is necessary
to account for economic development. The role of the entrepreneur
in capital formation and other activities is shaped by a combination
of factors involving personality types, cultural attitudes, techno-
logical knowledge, and available physical resources. Merely to list
these factors calls attention to the intangible character of all but
one of them. The personality-culture complex may someday be seg-
mented into measurable factors, but that achievement still appears
to be far in the future. It may be easier, in fact, to find some meas-
ures or uniform aspects of the entrepreneurial role as a whole. But
so far no indexes have met with any wide acceptance.
Turning to the supply side of the relationship, the amount of new
capital available from either domestic or foreign sources may vary
greatly in relation to national income. This subject has, of course,
been pursued recently by many able scholars, and the model pro-
posed here will no doubt seem oversimple. To try to distinguish the
element of entrepreneurship or enterprise, however, it may be per-
missible to divide the factors that produce commercially usable
credit into those dependent on the general culture and those directly
responsive to entrepreneurial activity. Such a division must be seen
simply as a heuristic device, since entrepreneurship itself is part
of the general culture and habits of saving are no doubt altered by
the returns on investment. But from the standpoint of this artificial
division we may say that Americans had certain propensities to
save, not directly the product of contemporary entrepreneurial
activity, and that the creative role of the entrepreneur in capital
formation was to mobilize existing savings, supply incentives for a
higher rate of saving, utilize credit mechanisms that could lead
to forced saving, and achieve productivity from the use of capital
that would add to the national income and particularly to the supply
of business savings. There are at least two types of entrepreneurial
functions involved in the performance of this highly generalized
role: those of the entrepreneur who acquires, allocates, and manages
340ENTREPRENEUR IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
capital for actual production; and those of the financial agent who
develops ways of raising capital for the use of others.
If history is to make its maximum contribution to any current prob-
lem it is usually necessary to go back to proximate origins and see
existing institutions in earlier and simpler forms. The historian sees
the activities of the big business manager of the twentieth century
emerging from those of the industrial entrepreneur of the nine-
teenth, and these in turn against the background of earlier American
agricultural and commercial culture. The historical technique gains
in utility for present world problems from the fact that in relation
to Great Britain the United States up to about 1850 was an under-
developed area.
This continued colonial relationship in ideas, technology, and in
most other aspects of the culture presents a case study, interesting
because it differs so markedly from the relationship of advanced in-
dustrial and underdeveloped areas at the present day. Since Amer-
ican development has seldom been seen in tenns of this analogy,
there is probably something to be learned from looking at it this
way.
1. The Entrepreneur in Early America
It is obvious from a cursory view of United States history that
the nineteenth century entrepreneurs represented a high level of
business energy. Statistical series document the rapid growth of
American business and productivity, particularly during the period
from about 1830 to the end of the nineteenth century. Of funda-
mental importance to an understanding of this period of tremendous
growth is the fact that potential entrepreneurs came from the al-
ready economically well-developed nations of Western Europe. The
immigrants to America were from Great Britain, Holland, Germany,
France, and Sweden, where, either in rural or urban areas, they
had in general been in contact with fairly advanced stages of trade
and handicraft. The natives of America, the Indians, were slow in
adopting capitalist culture patterns. But the immigrants, unlike the
people of most underdeveloped areas today, had value systems al-
ready adjusted to capitalist needs and goals. The fact that the two
early American colonizing agencies were companies designed to re-
turn profits to stockholders gave a business atmosphere to problems
of setflement.2
To a greater degree than the European population as a whole, the
2SeeWesley F. Craven, Dirsolution of the Virginia Company, Oxford, 1932.
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migrants represented heterodox minorities conditioned to searching
for new ways of coping with their social and physical environment.
In this country, Europeans found communities with relatively low
man-land ratios and almost unlimited opportunity for increasing
returns from the application of labor. As a result, a premium was
placed on putting to use devices or methods that would save man-
hours, regardless of their efficiency in relation to physical resources.
To some extent colonial society reproduced European feudal pat-
terns and recognized classdistinctions, but barrierstosocial
mobility were relatively weak. The early corners, who presumably
did much to set colonial culture patterns, were conditioned by the
needs of relatively open-class pioneer communities. There was no
great difficulty in achieving high social prestige through the acquisi-
tion of property within a man's own lifetime.3 This raises the question
of the extent to which this conditioning created an attitu1e of com-
petitiveness, or what has later been called a class-status-prestige
complex, stronger than that of the nonmigrating English or Conti-
nental peoples. Aside from business, including fanning, the avenues
for social prestige were relatively few and unrewarding. The salaried
positions in the army and navy were held by British officers merely
stationed here for a brief period. Similarly the highest offices of
government were of British appointment and the church had no
colonial hierarchy that led to such posts as canon, dean, and bishop.
In the later years of colonial development there were relatively few
opportunities to gain rapid wealth from the land. Thus trade and
manufacturing necessarily became chosen avenues for social mobility.
Elements favorable to entrepreneurial activity appear to have re-
sulted from the loose integration of American culture. Patterns dis-
rupted by transplantation and to a lesser extent by competition with
those of other cultures did not resume their old depth or fixity. This
meant that the entrepreneur could restructure the culture more
nearly to suit his ends. Ralph Linton, for example, has written of
the innovator as a deviant personality in terms of deeply patterned
cultures. This was not necessarily the case in the United States.
Since new environments and new possibilities in transportation con-
See W. T. Baxter, The House of Hancock, Harvard University Press, 1945,
and James B. Hedges, The Browns of Providence Plantations, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1952. Although Baxter is a professor of accounting, neither book
has a satisfactory analysis of capital' accounts. Merchants did not balance their
books with a view to determining net worth.
In The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, Bert F. Hoselitz, editor, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 75.
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tinuously forced change, innovators may well have had personalities
that could be called normal to the culture. In fact, if one uses the
term broadly to indicate new methods not previously practiced by
the particular group, innovation must have been frequent, once a
certain stage of development was reached in the new American
areas.6
Another factor favorable to the prestige and success of the
entrepreneur was the lack of established leadership in new com-
munities. The local merchant or manufacturer might readily occupy
the power vacuum which existed because of the lack of well-estab-
lished leading landowners and politically prominent families, such
as characterized old settlements.
As business success came increasingly to be the avenue to social
prestige, a large supply of men was available for entrepreneurial
pursuits. In addition, many occupations that in a foreign nation
would not have been regarded as entrepreneurial or conducive to
innovation or expansion in capital investment turned out to be such
in the United States. For example, an able man keeping a general
store in a growing part of the United States usually had an eye on
every local opportunity. As soon as he made a little money in the
store, he spread out into other local enterprises and became, in a
sense, a small-scale general entrepreneur. In good times, college
professors, doctors, and lawyers all joined in the scramble for wealth
—for the profitable allocation of capital.
Lewis Atherton's studies indicate the high social prestige and the
subsidiary enterprises of general storekeepers even in the relatively
static Deep South.
"Here," he writes, "there was a tendency to develop a position of
great influence. While this was primarily economic in nature, it also
frequently expressed itself in political terms. Membership on the
local city council was quite common, an indication of mercentile
influence in the rise of interior towns and villages. At least one
storekeeper was generally to be found on city councils, and fre-
quently the majority came from that occupation. Self-interest of
course made the work attractive. When municipal ordinances covered
5 There has been no historical study of personality types per Se. This sup-
position might be tested from the many biographies, collected letters, and
autobiographies of businessmen of the early nineteenth century. See Henrietta
M. Larson, Guide to Business Hi.story, Harvard University Press, 1948.
6 Modifying this is the fact that frontier communities with their cooperative
labor practices tended to standardize procedures. See Donald McConnell,
Economic Virtues in the United States, published by author, 1980, pp. 12ff.
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mercantile and peddling licenses, rates of drayage and the speed
at which drays could travel, business hours, rules for the city market,
inspection of weights and measures, fire regulations, and similar
subjects, it behooved a storekeeper to exert himself to obtain an op-
portunity to participate in making the decisions.
"Obviously the storekeeper devoted his attention primarily to his
immediate business functions. As emphasized throughout this study,
he provided the dry goods, groceries, and tools necessary for the
operation of farmers throughout the South. In doing this, he served
as a middleman between seaboard wholesalers and southern farmers,
thus handling the generous and long-range credit which character-
ized the system. He bartered merchandise for farm crops, and by
marketing the latter offered an outlet for southern farms.
"In the process of providing these basic economic services the
storekeeper naturally contributed to other economic and social
activities as well. In processing farm crops for market he provided
an elementary type of manufacturing by operating subsidiary enter-
prises such as sawmills and gristmils. Banking, farming, transporta-
tion, and land speculation were all so closely related to his scheme
of operation that he had to deal with the problems involved in each.
Moreover, storekeepers constituted the central group in the develop-
ment of interior villages and towns in the ante-helium period."7
There are no equally comprehensive studies of small mill, shop,
and financial enterprises in the more rapidly growing regions.
Eighteenth and nineteenth century America had subcultures with
differing sets of values. These ranged all the way from that of back-
country people who had much of the cultural outlook of the Middle
Ages still intact to the progressive business culture of Puritans and
Quakers along the noi-theastern seaboard. In this latter culture
frugality and saving were seen not only as manifestations of a proper
life, but also as a means for acquiring more economic power that
could be used for God's work. A foreigner viewing this segment of
the culture in 1836 wrote, "There is, probably, no people on earth
with whom business constitutes pleasure, and industry amusement,
in an equal degree with the inhabitants of the United States of
America." These were the proper values for entrepreneurship and
Lewis E. Atherton, The Southern Country Store, Louisiana State University
Press, 1949, pp. 191-193. Quoted by permission. See also his The Pioneer
Merchant in Mid-America, University of Missouri Press, 1939.
SF.J. Grund, The Americans, London, 1837., Vol. 2, p. 202. There is a
voluminous literature of accounts by foreign travelers from which the char-
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rapid capital formation. When carried westward by merchants,
teachers, skilled workers, and transportation executives this "puritan"
subculture came to dominate most of the nation.9
Another set of general conditioning factors is connected with the
rapid geographical and demographical expansion in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. A high reproduction rate insured an ex-
panding local population in almost every settled area. In addition
to this, immigration was rapid after about 1845. These factors meant
that, aside from a few declining agricultural areas in the East, a
business started in almost any community would grow if it merely
held its competitive position. The usual western promoter would
have agreed with J. W. Smith of Hudson, Ohio that it was safe con-
tinually to add new business ventures, since as the town grew
each wduld "support the other."bo
2. Capital Formation in the Nineteenth Century
In the early phase of industrialization most initial financing was
of local origin and there was an intimate relation between entre-
preneurs and investors. Expansion of the business was usually
financed by reinvesting profits. In this way the efficiency of the
entrepreneur as a manager had a direct bearing upon the rate of
capital formation. Harold F. Williamson has suggested that the
desire to keep control of invested capital may have led entrepreneurs
to favor reinvestment of earnings in their own firms rather than in
more productive outside activities.
The rise of large-scale transportation and public utility enterprises
from about 1820 on emphasized new methods of finance: widespread
sale of securities and creation of bank credit. The first method raised
the problems of entrepreneurial capital obtained from investors,
without intimate knowledge of the properties named on their cer-
acteristics of American culture might be reconstructed in a systematic way.
Hunt's Merchants Magazine, De Bow's Review, and the Bankers' Magazine also
contain articles on American business practices written by foreign (usually
British) businessmen.
McConnell's Economic Virtues in the United States, as cited, repays reading
in this connection.
10Thissituation is indicated in the early pages of city and county histories.
I found it to be the case with most successful local brewers. It is indicated
in my The Pabst Brewing Company (New York University Press, 1948), but
since Pabst was selling in the national market, expansion by reinvestment in the
company was more attractive than in the case of the local brewery. Therefore,
general investmeth activity came at a later stage in the career of Frederick
Pabst.
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tificatesof ownership, and by impersonal appeals in one section
of the country for capital to be invested in another.
Much ingenuity was required to raise enough capital to build
cities and railroads at the rates that prevailed from 1880 to 1860.
The population in cities over 8,000 increased from 4.9 per cent of
the total in 1820 to 16.1 per cent in 1860, and the number of such
cities from 13 to 141. From 1836 until the late 1840's, depression
and debt repudiations retarded the raising of capital for railroad
construction, but in the decade of the 1850's the United States laid
down more than 20,000 miles of track.
Capital for these ventures was raised by a series of devices in
which the role of entrepreneurship is often hard to distinguish from
that of government responding to public pressure. The means rep-
resented a mixture of techniques both borrowed from Europe and
originated in the United States:(1) Commercial banks bought
stocks for their portfolios." On occasion, states forced banks to in-
vest in internal improvements in order to gain renewal of their
charters. (2) Commercial banks extended renewable loans or de-
mand loans secured by stock to various business enterprises, par-
ticularly railroads. These loans became in effect a part of the capital
structure of the road, and were ultimately paid off from the sale of
securities. (3) Development banks were chartered by the states
for the express purpOse of issuing notes that could be used to
build internal improvements. Occasionally, railroad companies were
granted banking privileges to enable them to issue their own notes.
(4) Real estate companies were associated regularly with the con-
struction of railroads and often with the starting of factories.'2
Since the improvement projected promised an almost certain rise
in surrounding land values, large investors could be forced to buy
stock in the railroad or manufacturing company in order to be
included in the land company.13 (5) Construction companies, again
11 For material on this and other aspects of the mechanics of investment in
the nineteenth century see Fritz Redlich, The Moulding of American Banking,
Hafner, 1951, Vol. 2. His book contains the only adequate account of the rise
of investment banking.
12 For ezamples of real estate companies in manufacturing finance see George
S. Gibb, The Whitesmiths of Taunton, Harvard University Press, 1943, and
Charles W. Moore, Timing a Century, Harvard University Press, 1945, both
in the Harvard Studies in Business History.
13 There is plenty of material on railroad finance and promotion and the
early history of railroad companies; for an introduction see Frederick A.
Cleveland and Fred W. Powell, Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the
United States, Longmans, 1909.
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promising a more certain and immediate return than the improve-
ment that was being constructed, could often raise equity capital
or loans when the transportation company could not. (6) State and
local governments put up large sums for the purchase of railroad
and canal securities, generally through the sale of their own bonds,
and insofar as these investments were not serviced by the improve-
ment company the burden was borne by taxation.'4 (7) Entre-
preneurs also persuaded some of the states, such as Georgia, Penn-
sylvania, and New York, to build major railroads or canals at state
expense.15
In this broad capital-raising process the difficulty in distinguishing
between general cultural factors and those specifically connected
with the pattern of entrepreneurship becomes obvious. One might
say it was an entrepreneurial culture. In fact, it is hard to distinguish
between entrepreneurs and the rest of the population. From the
demands of their function, the entrepreneurs were presumably the
men of energy and imagination, along these material lines, and they
educated the rest. The rise of a belief in material progress and of
a willingness to make present sacrifices for future material rewards
had been going on since the colonial period.
The economic returns from improved transportation were so high
and widespread, particularly in interior communities previously
cut off from markets, that such improvements became a major goaI.'
Local people were ready to make sacrifices to secure transportation
and unquestionably dreamed of benefits that exceeded the ultimate
reality. The people of Oswego, New York, for example, were said
to be "unanimous for anything in the form of a railroad whether it
goes crooked or straight they seem to have no care."17 When the
capital required exceeded that which could be raised by local 'HarryM. Pierce contends that when governments invested in railroad
securities at prices that could not have been obtained in the open market,
the difference between the government and the market price was a subsidy.
Railroads of New York: A Study of Government Aid, 1826-1875, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1953, pp. 20-21.
See also Carter Goodrich and Harvey H. Segal, "Baltimore's Aid to Rail-
roads," Journal of Economic History, Winter 1953, pp. 2-35, and Milton Heath,
"State Aid to Railroads in the South," Journal of Economic History, Supple-
ment x, 1950, pp. 40-52.
'5Therewas also some financing of internal improvements by lotteries. See
H. J. C. Aitken, "Yates and McIntyre: Lottery Managers," Journal of Economic
History, Winter 1953, pp. 36-57. 'SeeLeland H. Jenks, "Railroads as an Economic Force," Journal of Eco-
nomic History, May 1944, pp. 1-21.
"Pierce, op. cit., p. 42.
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entrepreneurs, they joined with investors in efforts to secure state
aid.
Between 1885 and 1840 Illinois illustrated the excessive public
investment in a frontier area produced by a combination of popular
demand, persuasive entrepreneurs, and a great boom period.18 En-
couraged by a federal land grant of 290,914 acres, the legislature in
1835 authorized a $500,000 bond issue to finance a canal between
Lake Michigan and the Illinois River. As security for the bonds,
the state pledged the federal land and the canal tolls.
But this was only a beginning. The full force of the boom psy-
chology struck the state in 1836 and 1887. Land near the Chicago
end of the canal which had remained unsold at $1.25 an acre less
than ten years before now sold as high as $20,000 for a building lot.
Caught in the excitement of the early months of 1837, the legislature
established a comprehensive system of internal improvements. Seven
railroads were to be built at once, each starting from an intersection
with a navigable river, and construction work was to progress
simultaneously in both directions! Navigation of the major rivers
within the state was to be improved, and $200,000 was earmarked
for compensationto .counties in which no railroad or river improve-
ments took place. An issue of $8,000,000 in 6 per cent bonds, salable
only at par or above, was provided to pay for the state system. Need-
less to add, the depression which commenced in mid-1887 resulted
in abandonment of most of the work and default on the bonds.
Each new tier of western states went through such periods of
overoptimism and overinvestment, in either the 18B0's, the 1850's,
the 1870's, or the 1880's, and private enterprise followed the same
pattern. R. Richard Wohi has written a case history showing a
boom-time pattern of mid-nineteenth century private investment.1'
His account is especially interesting because it illustrates the tend-
ency of the optimistic business atmosphere to turn American pro-
fessional men into entrepreneurs. Wohi's leading figure, Henry Noble
Day, was a professor in the Western Reserve Theological Depart-
ment at Hudson, Ohio to whom the boom of the early 1850's brought
dreams that his village would become a great railroad center. Day's
conversion to business life was aided by the fact that education did
not share in the flush times. The closing of the Theological Depart-
18 See Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts,
Macmillan, 1935, pp. 102 if.
19 R. Richard Wohi, "Henry Noble Day," in Men in Business, William Miller,
editor, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp 178-188, passim. Quoted by per-
mission.
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ment in 1850 just as the railroad from Cleveland was nearing Hud-
son ended Day's teaching. He justified his transition to full-time
entrepreneur in Calvinistic terms: "The characteristics which Chris-
tianity in its present stage seems to require are chiefly vigor of in-
vention, skill in execution and subscribing to the true end of indus-
trial arts—utility."
As in most western towns the railroad seemed the key to un-
limited prosperity. Before the Cleveland and Pittsburgh even reached
Hudson and years before any through connection to the East, Day
was chartering branch lines and planning a transcontinental system
through the town.
"But for Henry Day himself the dream he had for Hudson had
become a sacred reality. He was able to anticipate its completion
when the first few spadefuls of earth were taken out for grading.
He proceeded therefore to enact the logic of his expectations. He
began to create a network of businesses in Hudson to service the
demands arising out of the railroad building boom and to cash in
on the enlarged market which would result once the roads were
completed.
"In 1849, Henry Day began what was to be the seat of nearly
a dozen separate businesses. That year he approached Western
Reserve College for a loan of $1,500 with which he would undertake
to construct a large commercial building. Since the railroad was
to come shortly to Hudson, there would be a great demand for busi-
ness floor space, of which there was hardly any available in the
town. Against the loan he would pledge the lot on which he intended
to erect the structure. In addition, he would pay the going rate of
interest and retire the loan as rapidly as he could.
"No sooner had he begun the actual building when hi plans for
the structure were enlarged into something far grander. Less than a
year later, the [unicompleted building had exceeded its planned cost
of $3,000....Beforethe structure was completed to his satisfaction
it had swallowed up $18,000, although the source of this capital re-
mains to this day a mystery which cannot be solved from the tangled,
incestuous financing which prevailed in Henry Day's enterprises.
"The structure was a magnificent aberration, entirely out of scale
with the relatively small, low buildings which filled the rest of the
village. It was a five-sided, three-story edifice—an earlier Pentagon—
and was soon packed full of a collection of businesses at the bottom
of each of which was Henry Day, impartially providing capital,
plans, and enthusiasm....
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"Inthe meantime the projected railroads brought a great stream
of cash and hundreds of workers into Hudson. Of the $200,000
pledged for the Clinton Railroad, $18,000 was expended within Hud-
son itself, a proportion far greater than it appears, since nany of
the subscriptions to stock were made in the form of lands, not cash.
The numerical expansion of the population also created a host of
new problems which boomed business. The greatest demand was for
shelter and Henry Day proposed to meet it with a vertically inte-
grated scheme for new housing.
"One of the greatest benefits of the railroad boom, its protagonist
argued, was to be the enhancement of local land values. Hence
Henry Day, associating himself with the most powerful elements in
the community, purchased—on credit, of course—large tracts of
land outside the main area of settlement in the town, but immedi-
ately adjacent to it. Here—in what he labeled 'Day's Addition'—he
proposed to rear the housing which was to accommodate the present
increase in population as well as the further additions which would
surely come after the railroads were fully built. To finance construc-
tion and sale of his houses, Day conceived a special kind of banking
organization, the 'Hudson Society for Savings."
The main sources of capital for the Day companies were the
enterprises of his relatives. He drew on the working capital of New
York and southern trading and banking companies and on family
wealth accumulated from earlier mercantile ventures in the East.
In this way eastern credit was stretched to the utmost for Ohio
improvements. The result, as in many similar instances, was col-
lapse of the whole structure in the business recession of 1854.
In Day's case and many others, including state-financed ventures,
most or a large part of the capital prematurely invested was lost. The
railroad culverts melted away as farmers "borrowed" the stones, and
the grading reverted to humps in the pastureland. But there were
nearly similar cases where the bad initial estimates, the "entre-
preneurial errors," as John E. Sawyer has called them, led to the
construction of ultimately valuable works that would not have been
undertaken or continued had the true costs and difficulties been
known in advance or at an early stage. Sawyer writes that "Once
in operation, to fit our conditions the project must have proved to
be such—according to the definition chosen, such a contribution to
the economic development of the community or such a source of
profits to its owners—as to have more than justified the total cost.
That it paid off in any form means, of course, that the error in esti-
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mating costs was at least offset by a corresponding error in the
estimation of demand."20
He cites as well-known instances the Welland and Middlesex
Canals, the Hoosac Tunnel, and the building of Sault Ste. Marie,
Michigan. In the latter case Francis H. Clergue built an industrial
community with power, pulp and other mills, machine shops, foun-
dries, nickel mines, iron mines, railroads, charcoal kilns, and finally
a large-scale'steel industry in advance of any local or otherwise estab-
lished demand. Sawyer concludes: "Here capital was progressively,
and more and more unwillingly, poured into a lasting exercise in
economic development that proved a near miss from the point of
view of its investors; but which was then so far under way that
the 'high social cost of abandonment' enabled it to command transi-
tional public funds when crisis came to the over-extended empire."
As the foregoing examples have illustrated, acute scarcity of local
capital in western communities did not prevent the coming into
being of an excess of capital equipment. In the upswings of the
business cycle there was a continuous trend toward overexpansion.
Business buildings were bigger and more numerous than the trade
warranted, railroads were built ahead of traffic, and factories were
started before there was an adequate market. The successful local
man would likely engage in more enterprises than he could ef-
fectively manage. But such excessive activity led to a continuous
movement of workers, either manual or white-collar, into the entre-
preneurial ranks. This, in turn, meant that entrepreneurs. were re-
cruited from a very large percentage of the total population and
that there was a good deal of movement into and out of entre-
preneurial activities.
Vigorous individual entrepreneurship may necessarily have a high
ratio of miscalculation and failure, a high ratio of entries and exits.
American entrepreneurs like R. H. Macy and Cyrus McCormick
failed in their early ventures, and many successful companies have
been through one or more bankruptcies. Managerial know-how, es-
sential to ultimate capital formation, was learned at the expense of
empty-handed creditors.
3. General Entrepreneurs in the Nineteenth Century
It has seemed convenient to refer to the men who organized and
controlled multifarious enterprises as general entrepreneurs. The
20JohnE. Sawyer, "Entrepreneurial Error and Economic Growth," in Ex-
plorations in Economic History, May 1952, pp. 200 and 203-204. Quoted by
permission.
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criteriaof general entrepreneurship is that the man should not
immerse himself in the details of management -in any single enter-
prise, but that alone or in cooperation with similar operators he
should control a number of enterprises in diverse, but not neces-
sarily unrelated, lines of business. A man like Erastus Corning of
Albany traded in hardware, manufactured iron, controlled rail-
roads, and was president of a bank that supplied credit for such
enterprises. 21
General entrepreneurs operating regionally or locally formed an
important link between the creation of credit and productive enter-
prise. As presidents or directors of banks they were in favored posi-
tions for negotiating loans. Sometimes "secured" by the stock of the
enterprise involved, more often merely by one- or two-name paper,
bank loans were frequently the source of both fixed and working
capital. During boom periods the imaginative ventures of these
entrepreneurs, such as Henry Day, undoubtedly drew bank credit
far in excess of local savings into long-term construction22 and by
the resulting inflation taxed the rest of the community for the benefit
of faster capital formation.
By the same mixture of enthusiasm and ability, entrepreneurs in
control of large ventures drew upon the capital resources of Europe.
This took place in two ways. First, since men like Cornelius Vander-
bilt, Henry Villard, Nathaniel Thayer, or John Murray Forbes were
known to foreign bankers, their participation in a venture was
a sufficient guarantee to attract foreign capital.23 Second, these men
and their companies advertised the West and its farming land. This
attracted immigrants with capital in cash or skill.24 At the least,
the economy gained an able-bodied adult worker without having
to pay for his upbringing. At the most, the economy might gain
the transplantation of a going enterprise, either agricultural or in-
dustrial, from Europe to America. For example, the Bests who
started the Pabst Brewery moved their business from Mettertheim
in the Rhenish Palatinate by selling their brewery and building a
new one with the proceeds in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.25
21 Irene Neu, thesis on Erastus Corning, Cornell University, 1948.
22 Jenks, op. cit.Seealso his The Migration of Briti8h Capital to 1875, Knopf,
1927.
23 See Thomas C. Cochran, "The Legend of the Robber Barons," Pennsyl-
vania Magazine of History and Biography, July 1950, pp. 311 if.
24 Charlotte Erickson is working on a thesis at Cornell on the recruitment of
labor from foreign countries in the nineteenth century.
25 Cochran, The Pabst Brewing Company, as cited, pp. 1 if.
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The general entrepreneurs played a major role in reshaping the
American environment to fit their needs. Small groups of them in
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia promoted and organized most
of the large privately owned transportation and public utility enter-
prises. They saw the possibilities, and paid the lobbyists needed to
secure charters for the major company and for attendant develop-
ment and construction companies.26 Their subscriptions to stock and
bonds, in either the main company or the construction company,
provided a considerable part of the initial funds and gave the banks
with which they were connected the confidence to extend loans.
It seems probable that the eastern groups of general entrepreneurs,
with their relatively good command of capital and their over-all
• view of situations, undertook long-range development more rapidly
than institutional or local interests would have. For example, before
the Michigan Central reached Chicago the Boston and New York
entrepreneurs responsible for its finance were already planning for
• a western connection; and before the western connection, the Chi-
cago, Burlington, & Quincy, reached the Mississippi the same entre-
preneurs were projecting an extension across Iowa.
Entrepreneurs interested in politics, like Stephen A. Douglas,
secured a policy of assisting railroads by federal land grants, de-
livered through the states from 1850 to 1860 and directly from the
• federal government to projected transcontinental lines from 1862
to 1871. These aided greatly in attracting domestic and foreign
capital to railroad construction.27 Investors who might be skeptical
about the immediate earning power of a railroad across the prairies
had faith in the ultimate value of the farming land. This seemed
particularly true of foreign investors. The land grants undoubtedly
drew otherwise unavailable money from England and Continental
Europe into projects like the Illinois Central and the Northern
Pacific.28
State and local credit also played a major part in starting the
canal and railroad transportation system. With considerable over-
simplification, one might distinguish two stages in the early develop-
ment of both finance and transportation: a first stage in which finan-
26 Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890, Harvard University
Press, 1953, p. 194.
27 Thomas C. Cochran, "Land Grants and Railroad Entrepreneurship," Journal
of Economic History, Supplement x, 1950, p. 62.
28 See Paul W. Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad and Its Colonization Work,
Harvard University Press, 1934, and James B. Hedges, Henry Villard and the
Railways of the Northwest, Yale University Press, 1930.
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cially weak entrepreneurs sought the aid Of the state and local gov-
ernments and welcomed state-owned enterprise as a needed supple-
ment; and a second stage in which stronger general entrepreneurs
bought out the government-owned enterprises, retired government-
owned securities, and proceeded on a private enterprise basis. The
dividing line between these stages depended largely upon the sums
required by the projected enterprises in relation to the local supply
of capital and the probability of immediate returns. In the East
there were few new state activities after 1850, although local sub-
scription to stocks and bonds continued into the 1870's.29 In the
Mississippi Valley state enterprise continued through the 1850's and
farther west, state and federal aid was common until the panic
of 1878.
The greatest demands for capital between 1850 and 1890 came
in connection with railroad construction. According to the admittedly
inaccurate capital estimates of the federal census there was $533
million invested in manufacturing (including hand and neighbor-
hood industries) in 1849 and only $818 million in railroads. By 1889
the two sums were $6,525 million in manufacturing and $9,680 mil-
lion in railroads. Henry Adams said, "My generation was mortgaged
to the railroads and nobody knew it better than that generation
itself."3° Negotiating and servicing this mortgage constituted the
greatest achievement of nineteenth century American entrepreneurs
in the field of capital formation.
The feat of assembling nearly $10 billion in capital, largely
through the security markets, should not obscure the fact that some
of this capital and much of the $6.5 billion credited to manufacturing
were the result of reinvested earnings. In industry, marketing, and
agriculture, entrepreneurs created capital through successful man-
agement that brought in large earnings, coupled with low salary
levels and small allocations to dividends or paid-out profits. During
the first twenty years of the corporate history of the Pabst Brewing
Co., for example, over 75 per cent of net earnings were reinvested
and less than 25 per cent paid out in dividends. Up to 1889 the
president and vice-president of this company, which was by then
worth $5,000,000, drew salaries of $2,500 a year.31 Other studies in
29 See Pierce, op. cit., Chap. a.
80 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams,HoughtonMifihin, 1930,
p. 240.
31 Cochran, The Pabst Brewing Company, as cited, pp. 84 and 94.
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company history indicate that this picture is probably representative
of family and other closely owned companies.
4. Entrepreneurs in Banking
So far the emphasis has been on the promoters and managers of
enterprise, but the supply of capital for internal improvements was
also a function of entrepreneurship in the field of banking, a product
of manipulation and innovation in the mechanics of money and
credit.
Redlich has covered the development of entrepreneurship in
United States banking so throughly in his Moulding of American
Banking that it is necessary only to summarize his findings here.52
Between 1800 and 1850, American financial entrepreneurs developed
institutions to encourage saving and to collect such funds in usable
poois. Chartered commercial banks, which had first appeared in
1780, spread rapidly during this period, and savings banks, build-
ing and loan associations, and life insurance companies were started.
While most of the investment from the latter three types of pooled
savings was in urban mortgages, this in turn released other credit
for manufacturing and transportation investment.33
Laws against branch banking in many states, and the willingness
of state legislatures after 1815 to charter banks, led to a great spread
of small banking units run on an experimental basis by local entre-
preneurs. In 1840 there were 900 banks; by 1861 the number reached
1,600. While there were various state stipulations regarding reserves,
taken as a whole the system was capable of expanding credit both
rapidly and unwisely. The unwise advances, in turn, led to bank
failures and the temporary prostration of local business. Whether a
few large banks with branches, such as exist in most European na-
tions, would have produced a more rapid economic growth can
probably never be decided. These thousands of• banking entre-
preneurs lacked expert skill in assessing risks and were therefore
likely to be bound by custom in extending credit, but they were
close to the needs of their loc1 communities, and they were no
doubt influenced by the risk-taking spirit of the local businessmen.
The other major development of this period was the beginning
of specialized investment banking. In the early nineteenth century
32 The Redlich work has been cited. See also Ralph W. Hidy, The House of
Baring in American Trade and Finance, Harvard University Press, 1949, and
Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875, as cited.
Roy A. Foulke, Sinews of American Commerce, Dun & Bradstreet, 1941,
pp. 89-150.
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theAmerican agencies for selling securities were numerous and
unspecialized. Securities might be contracted or negotiated for by
incorporated commercial banks, private banks, general enterpre-
neurs, foreign bankers or their agents, brokers, or traveling sales-
men. Most of these middlemen hoped to sell all or a large part of
the securities abroad. The close connections between American and
British financial markets gave investment in the United States a
different aspect from the buying of securities in other underde-
veloped areas. The chief British houses, such as Baring Brothers,
Thomas Wilson, or the Rothschilds, had either trusted correspond-
ents or agents in this country. Englishmen were used to appraising
American commercial risks and readily shifted to appraising the
risks of publicly or privately financed transportation.
The good standing of American state securities in the British
market, prior to the defaults of 1841, was one reason for the extensive
use of state credit for financing banking and transportation. By
1847, state debts, largely contracted in aid of transportation, totaled
$224 mi1lion. From about this time on, London provided a fair
market for issues of the larger American railroads, while the standing
of state securities was still depressed by defaults. As a result, well-
sponsored railroads found their own bonds more salable than those
of most of the states.
But the foreign market was not available to small transportation
companies and public utilities or to American manufacturing enter-
prises. Local money-raisers resorted to many devices. Lotteries, im-
provement banks, building and loan companies, and mortgage banks
all appeared within the first two decades of the nineteenth century.
Some of these, such as western improvement or mortgage banks,
were schemes for monetizing debt and then gradually passing
the obligations eastward. Underlying this ingeniousness in creating
credit were a faith in the immediate profitability of applying capital
to many processes and a confidence in the general devotion to the
goal of money-making.
Throughout the period before the Civil War, commercial banks
were both buyers and middlemen in the investment security busi-
ness. The Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania, during its
brief career following the end of the federal charter in 1836, took
a leading part in security negotiations. The companies chartered
under various state "free banking" acts also participated in invest-
ment business, particularly in state and municipal securities.
34Redlich, op. cit., p. 844.
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With the rapid spread of railroads and gas and water companies,
private bankers found their investment business becoming more
important in relation to the old stand-bys of note brokerage and
foreign and domestic exchange. August Belmont, as American agent
for the Rothschilds; Prime Ward & King; George Peabody; Drexel;
Brown Brothers; E. W. Clark; Corcoran & Riggs; and Vermilye
were among the houses that became sufficiently specialized to be
called investment bankers in the years before the Civil War.
The federal flotations of $2.5 billion in public debt during the
Civil War resulted in a new maturity for American financial markets.
The handling of the contracting, selling, and refunding of these
issues built up a few specialized houses that, with the exception of
Jay Cooke & Co., were to dominate the security markets in the
United States for the next sixty years. In the post-Civil War period,
as in earlier years, the strength of houses such as Drexel-Morgan,
J. & W. Seligman, or Kidder, Peabody lay largely in good foreign
connections, while the fatal weakness of Jay Cooke was his failure
to establish real strength in London, Paris, Berlin, or Frankfurt.
Between 1865 and 1880, American investment banking entre-
preneurs developed the underwriting and selling syndicate and the
practices of banker leadership and responsibility in the affairs of
their major clients. It is hard to estimate the effect of these practices
on capital formation. Cooperation in selling syndicates probably
mobilized more of the nation's savings for large-scale projects than
might have been reached through the earlier, less highly organized
efforts, but research would be needed to demonstrate this.
Still harder to judge is the effect of banker leadership, as illus-
trated by J. Pierpont Morgan. From the late 1870's on, Morgan asked
for and received representation on the boards of certain railroads
that he financed; by the middle 1880's he insisted on companies
retaining the services of the syndicate leaders responsible for out-
standing issues, at least in the case of his own clients; and by the
1890's he was initiating reorganizations and mergers of railroads and
industrial companies. Morgan's efforts probably drew more foreign
capital into the United States than would have come otherwise, but
the effect of his plans was often to check the rate of expansion of
a road or an industry so that new commitments would not endanger
the servicing of senior securities. Other leaders in the investment
banking field operated in much the same fashion. These bankers also
tended to share the view that monopoly created stability and a
35Cochran,Rdilroad Leaders, 1845-1890, as cited, p.71.
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well-orderedeconomy, whereas competition was upsetting and
dangerous.
5. Factors Retarding Capital Formation in the Nineteenth Century
While nineteenth century American culture appears to have been
one of the most favorable in world history for entrepreneurial activ-
ity, there were certain negative elements stemming either from the
general environment or from the attitude of certain groups of
entrepreneurs. Insofar as these elements curtailed or reduced the
vigor of creative entrepreneurial activity, they may be assumed to
have hindered capital formation.
One type of hindrance to effective entrepreneurial action was
maladjustment between labor supply and demand. With the shifting
of industry resulting from technological change, adjustment in the
case of labor presumably never approaches close to perfection, but
the process of internal westward growth and European immigration
to the eastern seaboard imposed unusual difficulties on the United
States. The decline of agricultural activities after about 1830 in
parts of the Northeast and an already large population tended to
produce a regional surplus of native-born labor. From the 1840's on,
immigrants arrived in the eastern ports at a rate generally in excess
of the growth of opportunities for local employment. How to draw
effectively upon these poois of labor was an entrepreneurial chal-
lenge throughout the last half of the nineteenth century. Entrepre-
neurs tried a number of expedients. Associations were formed in
the 1850's to move labor westward, chiefly at the expense of em-
ployers interested in western ventures. The difficulty with this device
was lack of any guarantee that the laborer would arrive and work
satisfactorily to repay the cost of his transportation. Some samples
of the numbers actually moved make it appear that most entrepre-
neurs regarded the risk as too great. Railroad entrepreneurs made
arrangements to move workers westward for their own purposes,
often with land as an ultimate reward for fulfillment of the labor
contract. Western states and territories, anxious to gain population,
established eastern and European agencies to encourage migration.
From the Civil War on, some companies made a business of import-
ing Asiatic or European workers under contract, but the practice was
prohibited by acts of Congress in 1882 and 1885, respectively. The
extent to which these devices equated supply and demand has still
to be investigated.
358ENTREPRENEUR IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
A second set of possible retarding factors stemmed from sectional
and local rivalries and ambitions that led entrepreneurs or their po-
litical representatives to sacrifice the general to what seemed the
special welfare. Part of the division of opinion came from geo-
graphical position, and part from differing types of entrepreneurship.
The large export agriculturist thought in terms, and had real eco-
nomic interests, different from those of the protected small manu-
facturer. Geographical-occupational cleavages led not only to con-
flicts over national policy, but also to a rather general preference for
locally instead of centrally controlled activities. Sometimes Congress
was swayed by local interests from all parts of the nation, as in
state banker opposition to central banking; at other times the in-
terest represented might be more strictly sectional, as illustrated in
the New England fear of loss of labor due to more liberal land laws.
Here again the effects of these pressures on capital formation have
never been determined. Although central banking, for example,
would have given businessmen a uniform currency and solved some
domestic exchange problems, it would also have tended to curtail
credit inflation, which was one of the important factors in capital
formation during the sharp upswings of the business cycle. It is hard
to tell whether the entrepreneurial pressure that contributed to the
writing of federal land laws in 1785 and 1796, under which very
little land was sold, had any considerable effect on the westward
movement, since the surrounding 'states had ample land for sale
on favorable terms. If the laws did check migration, it is also hard
to tell what effect this had on economic growth.56 The eastern busi-
ness argument that labor was needed there for commerce and in-
dustry and that western investment under existing conditions of
transportation was lost to the national economy undoubtedly had
some truth.
The planter-entrepreneurs who represented the slave plantation
system in Washington on many occasions blocked policies that might
have aided industrial capital formation. The most obvious issue in-
volved was the protective tariff. Except in 1816, the South was op-
posed to protection, and, aided by northern railroad and commercial
interests, it managed to prevent or modify tariff increases prior to
1861. The probable effect on the United States of a moderate rather
than a high tariff policy prior to the Civil War is a question that
86 For discussion of the land laws see Fred H. Harrington, Merle Curti,
Richard H. Shryock, and Thomas C. Cochran, An American History, Harper,
1949, Vol. i, pp. 221-223.
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has occupied economic thinkers for more than a century without
a conclusive answer being produced.
The planters came to fear the social effect of creating an urban
Negro working population, and, after a brief period of encourage-
ment to local industry from 1815 on, southern investors put their
capital to other use, often outside their own region. There has not
been sufficient study of southern investment to tell how much of the
planters' savings went abroad.
The South, to some extent, had cultural patterns common in under-
developed agricultural regions in the twentieth century. There was
high concentration of income, a general estimate for 1860 being
that three-quarters of the export income was distributed to about
8,000 families. But in spite of concentration of income, luxurious
living standards seemed to prevent the planter elite from promoting
a high rate of capital growth.
The problem of the internal efficiency of the specialized slave
plantation system is too complex to discuss here.37 But there is at
least a possibility that the planter-entrepreneurs, with their semi-
feudal cultural values, stood in the way of more rapid capital growth
both in their own section and in the nation as a whole.
The southern influence in Washington was hostile to many policies
of the entrepreneurs interested in developing the West. Not only
did the westward movement draw population away from the old
South, but the slave system could not readily be transplanted to
many new territories. While it has been noted that eastern business-
men also were doubtful of the value to them of rapid western growth,
after the middle 1840's the combination of heavy immigration and
increasing western investment opportunities won many of them
over to an expansionist policy. Hence, by the 1850's it was chiefly
southern influence that blocked federal subsidies for a centrally
located transcontinental railroad, freer disposal of western land,
river and harbor development, and other internal improvements.
Whether more lavish federal aid in the West at an earlier period
would in the long run have contributed to capital growth remains
a moot point.
A deterrent to capital investment similar to the rivalry of sectional
entrepreneurs in national politics was the power of local or special
interests in state legislatures. Businessmen and other citizens of the
See Emery Q. Hawk, Economic HLstorg of theSouth,Prentice-Hall, 1934,
pp. 271-273, and John S. Spratt, "The Cotton Miner," AmericanQuarterly,
Fall 1952, pp. 214-235,
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counties that benefited from the Erie Canal system in New York
State, for example, were able up until 1851 to get the legislature
to place clauses in railroad charters either prohibiting the carriage
of freight or forcing the payment of canal tolls on railroad ship-
ments.38 The Camden & Amboy Railroad in New Jersey was able
through special charter provisions and political influence to prevent
for thirty years the chartering of any competing New York—Phila-
delphia line.89
A third type of deterrent to entrepreneurial activity and capital
growth was the depression phase of business cycles. Fluctuations in
prices, business activity, and employment seem to have been more
severe than in the nations of Western Europe. As already illustrated,
American entrepreneurs appear to have reached greater heights of
incautious optimism during booms than did their European coun-
terparts, and consequently the ensuing debacles were more pros-
trating. On the one hand, the price inflations that usually accompa-
nied upswings undoubtedly led to diminished consumption by
receivers of fixed incomes and larger entrepreneurial profits, both
of which stimulated capital investment. But the relatively prolonged
stagnation in new investment during the major depressions to some
extent offset the capital gains of the boom.
Many leading entrepreneurs and some economic writers were
aware of a general cyclical movement and understood the merits of
countercyclical investment. But to raise capital by security flotation
in a depression was extremely difficult. This is abundantly illustrated
in the letters of nineteenth century railroad presidents. Even the
minor recession of 1848 led John Murray Forbes to write, "At this
moment it is impossible to get subscriptions to any Rail Road how-
ever promising." Ten years later he counselled, "Vie [should:1 let
our Stockholders recover from the depression of the past year and
regain confidence before we plunge into anything however good."
In 1874 John W. Brooks wrote, "The bare idea, even of discussing a
new project, would injure one's reputation for sanity." And looking
back on these years, Frederick W. Kimball noted that "During the
recent depression nobody would even listen to the establishment of
a new enterprise."°
38 Frank W. Stevens, The Beginnings of the New York Central Railroad, Put-
nam, 1926, pp. 267-273.
John W. Cacirnan, Jr., The Corporation in New Jersey, Harvard University
Press, 1949, pp. 54-59.
4° Quoted in Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890, as cited,pp. 105 and
106.
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A fourth set of deterrents to entrepreneurial action might be put
under the heading of insufficient security. This had many forms.
The most routine commercial transactions involved risks when con-
ducted across state lines and at a distance. Prior to the spread of
the railroad, inland transportation and transfer agents were unre-
liable. To be sure of receiving his goods intact and on time, the
inland merchant had to travel with them." Before the beginning
of credit agencies in the 1880's, it was difficult to know who could
be trusted in distant cities, and unfamiliar bank notes might prove
to be depreciated or counterfeit. State courts could impede collec-
tion of debts by "foreigners," and the status of corporations doing
business outside the state of their incorporation was questionable
prior to the 1880's. While the United States was nominally one
country, the difficulties of doing some kinds of interstate business
in the first half of the nineteenth century were almost as great as
though the boundary lines were those of independent nations.
Added to these insecurities arising from poor trade facilities and
discriminatory local statutes was a lack of the police protection
necessary for maintaining orderly markets. Robbery by stealth or
violence was frequent, particularly in the newer regions. Only a few
cities had organized police protection.
The low business ethics of many American entrepreneurs were
a hindrance both to business efficiency and to the raising of capital.
Confidence men selling shares or lots were abundant. Bankruptcy
with concealed assets was a common recourse for avoiding embar-
rassing obligations. Capital was frequently squandered in ways that
made it hard to draw the line between overoptimism and outright
dishonesty. In building the western railroads, for example, construc-
tion was often managed and partly financed by local entrepreneurs
who were, at the least, somewhat careless in handling easterners'
money. Forbes wrote, "My feeling ...is...thatLandowners and
R. Road contractors are the ones who too often get the whole benefit
of the money that capitalists put into the West."42 But corporate
stockholders were also defrauded by eastern operators of apparently
high standing. Railroads were gutted by construction companies con-
trolled by the railroad officers. Presidents of corporations printed
fake stock certificates and sold them on the exchanges. Contracts
were freely broken when it was inconvenient to live up to them.
"See Atherton, The Pioneer Merchant in Mid-America, as cited.
42Quotedin Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890, as cited, p.100.
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The result of such entrepreneurial practices was unquestionably to
discourage investment in the common stock of corporations.
A related deterrent to investment in stock was the lack of regula-
tion of security exchanges and original prospectuses. Let the buyer
beware was completely the rule up until the late 1860's. Then after
Drew, Fiske, and Could had swindled Commodore Vanderbilt by
wholesale printing of stock certificates, the New York Stock Ex-
change regulated itself to the extent of demanding information on
the total number of shares issued by a company whose stock was
traded on the Exchange. But the states and the federal government
continued their laissez-faire attitude. The effect was to increase the
preference of the conservative investor for mortgages or other forms
of local investment where he could keep watch on the entrepreneurs
who had his money.
6. Factors Retarding Capital Formation in the Late Nineteenth
and the Twentieth Century
By the end of the nineteenth century the rate of net capital forma-
tion was declining slightly in comparison with the rate of increase
in either national income or gross national product, and the latter
two series in turn were advancing at a less rapid rate than in earlier
decades. The apparent turn of the curve was undoubtedly affected
by changing cultural factors that have not been subjected to analysis
sufficient to support generalizations. The effect of the West as a
promised land and a stimulant to saving and investment was proba-
bly lessening. The problems of urban industrial society were empha-
sizing security and deemphasizing individual initiative, risk-taking,
and the "puritan" attitude. The confidence that change meant prog-
ress was probably less than in earlier yeais. A doctrine of consump-
tion was threatening the doctrine, of frugality and thrift. But in addi-
tion to these and similar deterrents to capital formation, the chang-
ing character of entrepreneurship played a part.
A number of important changes in entrepreneurial roles were un-
favorable to capital formation: the increase in the size of companies,
with an attendant bureaucratization of entrepreneurial functions; the
substitution of professional executives for owner-managers; the
greater persistence of monopolies and other large organizations re-
gardless of economic efficiency; the inheritance of managerial func-
tions by less able heirs; the supersedure of the influence of general
entrepreneurs by that of investment banking houses and other finan-
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cialinstitutions; and the deterring effect of taxes and government
regulation.
In the large companies that appeared rapidly beginning in the
1880's, the chief executives frequently rose through the ranks. Tljey
succeeded by being "good organization men" with a proper regard
for loyalties and morale. A study by Mabel Newcomer of the careers
of the top executives of the largest nonfinancial corporations for
1899, 1923, and 1948 shows the increasing trend away from inde-
pendent business backgrounds. Including in her "entrepreneur-
capitalist" group (those who have run their own business) "bankers,
brokers, and those engineers and lawyers who had a hand in organiz-
ing the corporation which they head," she finds that three-fifths of
the 1899 group fall in this category, one-third of the 1923 group,
and only one-quarter of the 1948 group.43 The attitude of these
professional entrepreneurs toward liquidation or serious risk-taking
was likely, to say the least, to be more conservative than that of
the owner-manager (owning entrepreneur) or the general entre-
preneur.
Not only was the salaried professional disinclined to pursue poli-
cies that might eliminate his job, regardless of the profitability of
these policies to the stockholders, but he might also be loath to
recommend investments that would upset personal relations within
the organization. For example, the assets of a steamship company
became almost completely liquid during World War II through the
sinking of its vessels and resulting insurance payments. There was
little prospect that the company's normal trade would be profitable
for new vessels in time of peace. The chairman of the board, a large
stockholder, and an independent capitalist played with the idea of
liquidating the operating end of the business and investing the
capital in more promising enterprises. Profit considerations pointed
overwhelmingly in that direction. But none of the professional man-
agers in the company, whose jobs would disappear, favored such a
plan. In the end the company decided to continue its customary type
of operations. The pressures of personal relations and the momen-
tum of a going concern won out over what appeared to promise
maximization of profit for the stockholders.
These considerations plus that of size alone, and threatened gov-
ernment prosecution under the antitrust laws, tended to make big-
"The Chief Executive of Large Business Corporations," Explorations in
Entrepreneurial History, October 1952, pp. 18-14. See also the articles by
Winifred Gregory and Irene Neu and by William Miller in Men in Business,
as cited.
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company entrepreneurs think more in terms of maintaining a given
market position and stabilizing sales than in terms of continued tech-
nological innovation and expansion at the expense of competitors.
Furthermore, if one or a limited number of companies controlled
production in an industry, it was possible for entrepreneurs to slow
down the pace of innovation in the interest of reducing risk and
lengthening the period of utilization of existing equipment—a proc-
ess that might increase immediate purchasing power but siow down
capital formation and future production. Well-known illustrations
of the slowing down of innovation in the interests of more complete
utilization of existing equipment are the American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.'s treatment of the hand-set phone after 1907, and
General Electric's and Westinghouse's relatively slow response to the
possibilities of fluorescent lighting between 1896 and 19S8.
If complete figures could be assembled, it might turn out that,
other things being equal, the larger a firm the longer its life ex-
pectancy. Sampling studies point in this direction. But if the longev-
ity is because of size rather than economic efficiency, the prolonga-
tion of the large unit presumably hinders new capital investment
and ultimately retards the increase of productivity in the industry.
Looked at from the standpoint of the present discussion, this is
another example of diminished entrepreneurial efficiency in capital
allocation resulting from bigness.
There have been no quantitative studies of the qualitatively rec-
ognized shift in entrepreneurship from the founding generatiqn in
medium and big business to the sons and heirs of the founders. The
period 1880 to 1910 would appear to embrace many such shifts. It
seems likely, from isolated case studies, that the second generation
tended to be both less able and less interested in expansion than its
predecessors.4'
During the same period the increasing size of security flotations,
the better organization of the American money market, and the rise
See N. R. Danielian, A.T.&T., Vanguard, 1989, pp. 102-103, and Arthur
A. Bright,Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 384-391.
Paul C. Clark in The Structure of American Economy, 1919-1939 (Wassily
Leontief, editor, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1951) pictures the investment policy of AT&T
as a kind of automatic adjustment to new demand on a basis worked out by
engineers. Entrepreneurial decisions do not appear explicitly. 4Anumber of business histories illustrate this point. Among them see
Harold F. Williamson, Winchester, Combat Forces Press, 1952; C. W. Moore,
Timing a Century, Harvard University Press,1945; Thomas Navin, The
Whitin Machine Works since 1831, Harvard University Press, 1950; and
Cochran,The Pabst Brewing Company, as cited.
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of strong American investment banks and insurance and trust com-
panies all deprived the general entrepreneur of his control over
capital and thereby weakened his authority. The bankers institu-
tionalized general entrepreneurial functions, and the representatives
of banking houses took the independent financier's place of authority
on boards of directors. The effect seems to have some similarity to
that of the replacement of owner-managers by professionals. The
investment bankers were interested in stability and "sound" financial
practices which would tend to insure the servicing of bonds. They
were often unwilling to agree to new investments requiring security
issues unless these fitted in with the anticipated movements of the
stock market or their general financial plans.
Some new industries, when they reached the point of needing large
capital issues, were held back by the conservatism of institutionalized
financial entrepreneurship. The automobile and moving picture in-
dustries offer illustrations. In automobiles, investment bankers re-
fused to back W. C. Durant's original organization of General
Motors. When this company finally secured banker aid in 1910 the
conditions were onerous financially and involved effective banker
control of the company during the lifetime of the loan. Under this
system, for the next five years, General Motors sales increased less
rapidly than those of the industry as a whole.46 In motion pictures
Fox and Loew's both encountered Wall Street indifference or hos-
tility. In other words, the bankers represented conservative elements
generally opposed to taking new types of risk, even though the latter
might promise considerable economic gain if successful.
The deterring effect of tax and regulatory policies on entrepre-
neurial capital formation has been written about extensively. For
instance, the relative failure of the railroads to improve their capital
structure and equipment between 1910 and 1918 is blamed by
competent scholars on the psychologically discouraging effect of
overzealous regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
failure to achieve any net private capital formation during the 1930's
has frequently been blamed on the effect of New Deal regulations
on entrepreneurial initiative.
The diversion of capital into enterprises lacking comparative ad-
vantage by tariffs and subsidies is another example of government
"interference." Entrepreneurs would not have invested in new Amer-
ican merchant ships from 1936 on, save for large-scale government
subsidy. Insofar as the economy had unemployed resources in this
46Raph Epstein, The Automobile Industry, A. W. Shaw, 1928, p. 221.
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period, such allocation of capital may have cost nothing, but in
principle it produced facilities available more cheaply from foreign
nations.
It seems likely that the direct effect of regulation is always adverse
to entrepreneurial initiative, but rate-fixing, for example, may have
an indirect stimulating effect on technological innovation. An ex-
president of a telephone company remarked in conversation that
AT&T had to depend on research and resulting improvements in
order to make the profits necessary for dividends and expansion
under a system of government-controlled rates.
Against this list of possible deterrents to active and intelligent
entrepreneurial risk-taking arising from twentieth century condi-
tions should be set some favorable factors: increasing public willing-
ness to invest in stock exchange securities; the accumulation of large
pools of small savings by banks and insurance companies; the em-
ployment of specialists, such as industrial engineers, economists,
and accountants, who, aided by business periodicals and special re-
ports, tended to produce more calculated and presumably more
efficient investment policies; the persistence of small business; and
direct government aids to, and tax incentives for, investment.
Increasing public familiarity with security investment arose from
many sources. Urban middle and upper class income-receivers were
getting a larger percentage of the total income as urban population
became larger in relation to rural, and as entrepreneurial, managerial,
and professional occupations increased. This group was, presuma-
bly, more likely to invest in securities than was the farm or small-
town population. As business units grew larger, more were publicly
financed and the securities of old, well-established companies offered
reasonably safe investments. In addition, increasingly active security-
selling by banks and brokerage houses from 1897 to 1929 and the
government bond-selling campaigns of World War I undoubtedly
swelled the ranks of security-holders. Hence, entrepreneurs could
undertake large ventures with more assurance of adequate and eco-
nomical financing.
In this connection it may be noted that as successful companies
came to provide more of their working capital from profits or
security issues, the demand for short-term, renewable loans began
to fall, particularly in the major metropolitan areas. As a result,
banker-entrepreneurs in the 1920's were forced to do more of their
lending with securities as collateral, and to buy more securities for
bank portfolios than in previous decades. This transferred much
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ofthe strain of the 1929-1933 decline from other enterprises to the
banks themselves. Whereas short-term loans had in general been
collectable, the banks were now left holding securities that in some
cases declined to a fraction of their former value. However, the
problems of banker entrepreneurship in the l92O's and 1980's have
been so thoroughly discussed and investigated that nothing can
be added here.
The accumulation of vast capital pools from insurance policy
premiums and bank deposits went on rapidly from the 1890's, partly
as a result of aggressive selling campaigns by insurance and bank-
ing entrepreneurs. The life insurance companies granted large areas
to central agents, to be exploited on a commission basis. Banks
fought for deposits by sending salesmen to call on the more sub-
stantial businessmen and by advertising extensively to attract small
depositors.47 Investment trusts also drew the savings of small in-
vestors into large pools. After World War II, pension funds became
an important form of pooled savings, amounting by 1952 to over $2
billion a year.48 In addition, corporate savings in the form of reserves
against depreciation or depletion represented large blocks of capital
available for investment..
Looked at broadly, the increasing emphasis on both personal and
corporate financial security was putting the disposition of a large
portion of savings into the hands of professional entrepreneurs. Un-
questionably, these pooled resources offered an increasingly good
market for securities regarded as safe investments. Between 1947 and
1951 about 40 per cent by value of the new security issues were
sold privately to other companies. In the case of large corporate
issuers and large buyers, investment bankers had no entrepreneurial
role in the proceedings. But the bankers could still put small issuers
in touch with small insurance companies and collect a "finders fee."
The entrepreneurs of commercial banks and insurance companies
also took a direct part in allocating capital for long-run uses through
For insurance see Shepard B. dough, A Century of American Life In-
surance, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. 158-172 and 239-243; Marquis
James, The Metropolitan Life, Viking, 1947, pp. 840-345; and Owen J. Stalson,
Marketing Life insurance, Harvard University Press, 1942, pp. 508-648. There
is no adequate history of the entrepreneurial and marketing aspects of banking
in the twentieth century. I have made certain studies for a large New York
bank, which have some manuscript discussion of the pre-Worid War I opera-
tion of New York banking, but all of this material is treated as confidential.
48Formore on these new forms of savings and investment see Donald L.
Kemmerer, "The Marketing of Securities, 1930-1952," Joutnal of Economic
History, Fall 1952, pp. 454-468.
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term loans. To improve their languishing business in the middle
1980's, banks started lending funds to selected customers on a
periodic amortization basis for as long as ten years. After World
War II, bank terms were generally cut to five years, but insurance
companies were often prepared to assume such a loan for ten years
more. Through amendment of state laws, life insurance companies
and trustees were permitted to invest limited amounts in equities. In
this way insurance executives in the 1930's became entrepreneurs of
housing development. At this same time the taking over of collateral
forced banker-entrepreneurs, temporarily at least, into equity owner-
ship.
As with most of the twentieth century changes discussed here,
the effect of this minor revolution in financial practices on net
capital formation seems ambiguous. A much larger proportion of
total savings than ever before was automatically mobilized and put
in the hands of entrepreneurs. Or conversely, the private investor
had relatively less to say about the formation of capital. But the
professional entrepreneurs who control the funds have to view them
in general as reserves whose value must be protected rather than
as capital that can properly be put into high-risk, high-profit enter-
prises. On this basis small businessmen claim to be largely pre-
vented from drawing upon these corporate funds, while the local
man of large income, with his savings cut by insurance, pensions,
and taxes, cannot perform his historical role of risk-taking investor.
The spread of business information firms, expert consultants, and
other special services, leading presumably to what Arthur H. Cole
has called a more cognitive type of entrepreneurship, went on rapidly
around the turn of the century. Companies set up legal departments,
authorized shop procedure analyses, introduced cost accounting,
and made more use of forecasting.° Insofar as these expedients in-
creased the efficiency of production, they added to the value of
already-invested capital, and thereby increased total capital. But
the battle was far from one-sided. As studies of the relative efficiency
of large and medium-sized business have indicated, some of these
special services, at least, scarcely compensate for the problems in
forecasting and operation introduced by the increasing size of
companies.
Over the last 150 years management has been hard pressed to
keep pace with the changes introduced by new technology. It does
The Research Center in Entrepreneurial History at Harvard is studying
the impact of Taylorism on American business.
369COCHBAN
notseem a foregone conclusion that the large-company entrepreneur
of today, with a high percentage of specialized staff among his
employees, is necessarily better able to cope with his particular
environment than was the owner-manager of the early nineteenth
century selling in local or regional markets. It is possible that the
"revolution in transportation" and the rapid growth of a competitive
national market outdistanced the devices of management in the
mid-nineteenth century and produced a period of relatively poorly
informed entrepreneurship for which this later flowering of special
services offered a cure.5°
The rise of large bureaucratic organizations in which decisions
were made by professional administrators should not obscure the
fact that a great part of the capital allocation in the economy has
remained in the hands of small enterprisers. According to both
the Commerce Department and Dun & Bradstreet's listings of firms,
the number of enterprises has somewhat more than kept pace with
United States population increase during the twentieth century.51
Including the policy-making officialsof large companies, there-
fore, the percentage of Americans engaged in entrepreneurial activ-
ity other than agriculture has substantially increased. Many of these
smaller firms, to be sure, are not in a position to seek more of the
market by reducing prices, although almost any of them may grow
by offering better service. Many operate in specialized markets that
do not encourage expansion through additional capital investment
in that particular business. But in general it may be assumed that
in this small-industry, -transportation, and -service area of the econ-
omy, many of the entrepreneurial culture patterns of the nineteenth
century still persist.
There are also substantial regions of the United States that still
are underdeveloped areas. Large parts of the South and Southwest
have lacked the managerial and labor skills necessary to establish a
broad pattern of industrialization. In West Texas, for example,
entrepreneurs interested in investing in new types of industry often
find the banks ready to finance only cattle, oil, crops, and a few other
old lines of activity.52 Furthermore, the federal tax law allowing a
large deduction for depletion encourages further investment in oil,
50 For criticism of the general inefficiency of iron and steel entrepreneurs in
the 1870's see Andrew Carnegie, Autobiography, Doubleday, 1923, pp. 129 if.
Rudolph Jones, The Relative Position of Small Business in the American
Economy, Catholic University of America Press, 1952, pp. 34-35.
52 Based on interviews with selected Texas entrepreneurs, summer 1950.
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and the price support program reinforces cultural leanings toward
investment in agricultural land.
Therefore, while it may be affirmed that these underdeveloped
areas foster a relatively high degree of entrepreneurial energy in
capital allocation, this is expressed in specialized and limited ways.
Both the Texas and southern California bankers and businessmen
interviewed presumed that the general level of assessment of in-
dustrial risk and wise allocation of capital were highest in the old
centers of the East and Middle West.
For these reasons, and because of the high stage of development of
big companies in the older industrial areas, much of the new de-
velopment of the resources of the Gulf Coast, the Rocky Mountain
states, and even the Pacific Coast is being carried on by branches of
established national concerns.
While in certain lines of business the entrepreneur may have his
range of choice curtailed by bureaucratic or monopolistic arrange-
ments, government has provided him with increasing facilities and
safeguards for conducting his operations. Highway and bridge con-
struction in conjunction with the motor vehicle have made major
investments possible in new areas and have encouraged entrepre-
neurs to relocate plants.53 Improved police and fire protection and
more uniform state laws have all encouraged investment in new
areas. Only in the twentieth century have some parts of the United
States become sufficiently regulated to permit the easy conduct of
business. There has been too little historical study of twentieth
century business, and of the service group in particular, to estimate
the stimulating effect of these factors on entrepreneurship.
Finally, the allocation of capital by entrepreneurs has been pro-
foundly influenced since 1940 by government military poiicy. Entre-
preneurs have been partially relieved of the necessity of deciding
what forms new investment should take. The nineteenth century
situation of obvious needs in excess of capital resources has been
largely recreated. Under these circumstances it is difficult to esti-
mate the role of the entrepreneur in capital formation under condi-
tions of stabilized government demand and fewer shortages in pro-
ductive resources.
7. Conclusion.
A survey of the history of American capital formation, which
prior to 1940 was directed to a large extent by the imagination of
See K. William Kapp, The Social Costs of Private Enterprise, Harvard
University Press, 1950.
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entrepreneurs,supports the hypothesis that growth depended more
on where and how capital was invested than on the absolute quan-
tityof voluntary savings, that well-managed capital increased
rapidly from the reinvestment of earnings. In good times entrepre-
neurs, largely through the mechanisms of banking, drew on credit
in excess of savings—in fact, without much regard for the immediate
level of domestic saving. Resulting infiations forced involuntary sav-
ing on those receiving fixed incomes.
A very large part of the capital goods created by these entrepre-
neurs had ultimate economic value, even though the original pro-
moters may have failed to produce early profits. Capital invested in
transportation paid enormous economic returns through the open-
ing up of natural resources, which included coal in close proximity
to iron ore. Similarly, investment in manufacturing brought ulti-
mate profits because of cheap fuel and raw materials and the large
home market made available by transportation. But if the resources
in agricultural land or minerals had been less, the same quantity of
initial capital and the same diligence in operation would not have
produced the same end results or given the same incentives to
further effort. Entrepreneurial activity is seen, therefore, as related
to the utilization of resources, and to an initially low man-land ratio
and a rapid increase in population.
The precise influence of the entrepreneur in this capital growth
is as difficult to measure as is the influence of any single factor
mentioned above. It seems probable that such social complexes can-
not be broken down into measurable factors, and must, for the
present at least, be treated as Gestalts. The whole process of which
entrepreneurial energy was a part changed signfficantly over time.
To men of the nineteenth century brought up in Western European
traditions it was obvious that America needed transportation, and
that transportation would eventually pay for itself. To say the same
thing in general economic terms, there were valuable resources that
could be exploited by the existing technology. The cost of railroads
or canals over long distances was very high; for sixty years after
1830 there was this major industrial use for capital. Large additional
sums were necessary to bring high-grade mines into effective produc-
tion. With abundant materials, simple machines promised good re-
turns from mass production. In this complex, rewards for individual
success were high. All that was needed for rapid growth was for
entrepreneurial imagination to proceed in the routine patterns of
the culture.
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The ending of what may very tentatively be called the early or
pioneer stage of industrial economy and the rise of large corporate
business units changed the character of the complex leading to
growth. Judging by Kuznets' figures on the declining rate of net
capital formation and by the increasing percentage of non-agricul-
tural businessmen in the population, the change appears, up to
1940 at least, to have retarded activities leading to capital formation
by entrepreneurs. The superseding of independent financiers (gen-
eral entrepreneurs) by investment bankers, the rise of professional,
salaried managers, the growing complexity of the industrial economy,
and the increase of government taxation and controls all appear to
have worked against imaginative risk-taking.
Some leading scholars of the subject have been led to the belief
that private entrepreneurship is destroying itself by its own creations
of bigness and p1anning. Whether or not this view is correct, there
seems no doubt that the entrepreneur of the mid-twentieth century
operates in a different cultural setting and responds to different
motivations than did his predecessor of 1850. Meanwhile, the large-
scale entrance of the federal government as a user of capital equip-
ment tends to obscure the underlying economic trends in entrepre-
neurial risk-taking or capital allocation and use. Under these cir-
cumstances, with the entrepreneur hemmed in by bureaucracy,
complexity, and political action, it is hard to forecast his role in
capital formation.
C 0 M M E N T
ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, Harvard University
I agree with much of what Hoselitz has said in his very interest-
ing paper. It is primarily my need to conform to "role expectation"
as a discussant that has caused me to put down on paper a few
comments on points where some disagreement exists.
Hoselitz has attempted to place the treatment of entrepreneurship
and capital formation in France and England against the back-
ground of the respective rates of economic development in the two
countries. Although this is a fruitful approach, some critical remarks
may be in order.
Hoselitz says that in the sixteenth century the two countries were
See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper,
1942, and Fritz Redlich, "The Business Leader as a 'Daimonic' Figure, II,"
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, April 1953, pp. 289-299.
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approximately equal with regard to productivity and technology,
with France probably having a slight edge. We cannot be absolutely
sure, but this seems a very plausible statement. Presumably, the rate
of growth was faster in England during the sixteenth century, partly
because of internal disturbances in France (as is generally recog-
nized) and partly because of the greater backwardness of England
at the beginning of the century (a fact less generally admitted). In
this respect the penetration of German technological progress into
English metallurgy and mining was of central relevance.
Furthermore, Hoselitz introduces a table which indicates that
the rates of economic growth during the first half of the nineteenth
century were much higher in England than in France. Even if ex-
pressing national income in constant 1918 prices raises frightening
index number problems, it is perhaps plausible to assume that the
main point the comparison is designed to convey is well taken. But
why is Hoselitz concerned with the sixteenth century at all? This is
not entirely clear to me. Is it because he asserts that the rate of
growth in France has been lower than in England ever since the
near equality in productivity levels in the sixteenth century? There
is at least such a hint in the paper. But if we are allowed to play
a little with the figures in his table, the result would seem to cor-
roborate this writer's previously formed impressions, namely, that
per capita income in England in 1800 may have been about 10
per cent higher than in France, but not much higher.
Hoselitz speaks at length of the terrible effects on France of the
financial crisis of 1559; he places much emphasis on the devastating
effect of the religious wars that followed that crisis; he cites in the
same connection the dire effects of the price revolution and, in fine,
of the expulsion of the Huguenots. I find it difficult to agree that
the effects of the price revolution upon French economic develop-
ment were as unmitigatedly unfavorable as Hoselitz makes them out
to be. But this is beside the point. The point rather is that if there
had been such "terrible economic devastation" in France as is de-
scribed by IToselitz (page 298), the closeness of the per capita
levels of output in the two countries at the end of the eighteenth
century is rather surprising. Moreover, if despite all the disabilities
France succeeded in maintaining or nearly maintaining her posi-
tion vis-à-vis England, the French economy must have done very
well in the intervening period. And the proper question to ask
should refer to the reasons for such an astonishing performance.
Hoselitz does not ask the question explicitly, but it seems that his
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reference to the industrialization policies of the mercantilistically
oriented governments in France is designed to provide an answer to
the tacit question, and the same answer is intended to serve as an
explanation for the discrepancies in the rates of growth as between
the two countries in the first half of the nineteenth century. In
other words, the industrialization policies of the French government
succeeded in keeping up the rate of growth till the end of the eight-
eenth century, but at the same time they prevented the emergence
of a self-reliant entrepreneurial group interested in risk-taking and
ready to commit itself to the policy of long-term investment in fixed
capital.
This, of course, is a possible answer if one is willing to accept
the particular sociology and reading of history implicit in it. The
government performs wonders for industry by providing entrepre-
neurs with multifarious grants, interest-free loans, tax reductions,
etc. But the result is the rentier psychology of the French entre-
preneur. "This central role of the government doubtless enhanced
the feeling of dependence on government service and government
subsidies for new enterprises and contributed to the well-known
aspiration to attain a rentier status, which was and still is so typical
of the French middle class" (page 304). Is this not too sweeping?
Not that it is necessarily incorrect. But I should want some more
specific evidence as to the plausibility of that sequence.
Surely, the Russian state of the 1890's did a great deal to en-
courage entrepreneurial activities, and by devices that were not dis-
similar from those used by the French government. But if one con-
siders the very great changes that took place within the entrepre-
neurial classes between, say, 1885 and 1910, it is very difficult to
argue that state aid had resulted in the destruction of entrepreneurial
initiative. In fact, everything we know points in the opposite direc-
tion. It can be argued, of course, that the Russian state of 1885-
1900 did not exercise any regimentation of production comparable
to that of Colbertian or post-Colbertian France. This is true. But
I still feel that Hoselitz's history, like his sociology, may be a little
too sweeping. He says: "Although a certain amount of private initia-
tive was evident, the role of the government always remained para-
mount, and even continued in influence after 1789, especially under
Napoleon" (page 304). Surely, this is a patently inadequate descrip-
tion of France in the second half of the eighteenth century, when
there was a great decline in the degree of economic regimentation
and the economy seemed to grow at a fast clip.
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Hoselitz is quite right in referring to Napoleon. But Napoleon was
in many respects a return rather than a link in an unbroken chain.
It is perfectly true, I think, that the policies during the Continental
blockade created complex problems which the weak Restoration
governments could not readily solve, and the commercial policies
of the Bourbons were to some extent dictated by the legacy of the
industrial hothouse inherited from the Napoleonic period. Still, much
more important than that legacy were the political necessities of
the Bourbons, that is, their need to find support within specific nar-
row groups. This need resulted in the toleration of the solidarity
bloc and the imposition of a tariff policy which isolated France
economically and accounted more than anything else for the relative
economic stagnation in France in the first half of the nineteenth
century. I believe at any rate that itis possible to explain that
stagnation without much recourse to such deficiencies in entrepre-
neurial vigor as may have existed in France. But was France really
lacking in entrepreneurial vigor?
How was the period of stagnation broken? By the appearance of
a group of great entrepreneurs, many of them belonging to the
Saint-Simonian group, as is so well described in Hoselitz's paper.
But what caused the sudden appearance of those men? Hoselitz is
not quite sure. He speaks of "a strange accident, or perhaps
the logic of historical necessity." I do not quite know what the latter
means and I should have preferred to be led across Buridan's
bridge more gently and more slowly. But I can see that it is dif-
ficult for Hoselitz to perceive in that event more than a strange acci-
dent. After having shown how government policies in France ruined
the French entrepreneur and after having explained the low rate
of growth before 1850 in terms of lack of entrepreneurial spirit, he
was indeed entitled to expect that the last sparks of entrepreneurial
strength had been successfully extinguished between 1815 and
1850. That the actual outcome was very different is certainly strange
but only in the light of the somewhat unguarded generalizations
that have been made earlier.
I feel it is much more natural to explain the change by reference
to the liberalizing influence of Napoleonic policies, which broke
up the solidarity bloc and created a climate within which entrepre-
neurial activity could successfully unfold and be applied to the
great innovations of the period. Seen in this light, the appearance
of the Saint-Simonian group is neither a strange accident nor the
result of some iron law of historical development, but a rather nat-
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ural consequence of the very nature of entrepreneurship. I doubt
very much that a group which by definition constitutes an elite
group, a group of uprooted men who have forsworn tradition and
allegiance to the dominant value system of the community (Schum-
peter), can be said to be lastingly influenced by extraneous unfavora-
ble conditions. The Saint-Simonian episode shows that with particu-
lar clarity.It reveals the suddenness with which entrepreneurs
appear and are ready for constructive action once a favorable
conjuncture of circumstances has developed. Let me add that the•
history of Russian entrepreneurship after the emancipation of the
peasantry seems to point to the same conclusions. There is, of course,
no doubt that the entrepreneur provides a powerful dynamic force
in economic development. But in attempts to construct models of
economic development which deal with sudden initial spurts of
economic growth, it is not at all paradoxical to say that just because
the entrepreneurs are an active individualistic group composed of
independent men, in a certain sense, they are likely to play the role
of the dependent rather than the independent variable. (This, of
course, does not mean that for other purposes and in other contexts
it is not most profitable and illuminating to focus attention upon
changes in entrepreneurial attitudes and behavior. Quite the con-
trary is true. It is, for instance, perfectly clear that changes with
regard to standards of honesty and time horizons may be of the
greatest possible importance for the understanding of the changing
nature of economic development.)
Similarly, the role played by the banks in the industrial develop-
ment of France is explicable much less by the scarcity of entrepre-
neurial talent than by the scarcity of capital under specific condi-
tions of backwardness; that is to say, in conditions where capital-
intensity of output has increased as compared with what it had been
in an advanced country. It does make some difference whether the
industrialization spurt occurs during the "textile age" or the "railroad
age." In addition, in a backward country the very breadth of the
industrialization effort calls for a much larger supply of capital than
was the case with the more gradual development in the advanced
country. I agree with the author that the banks in fact did perform
entrepreneurial functions. But in general, with regard to the banks
as in so many other respects, there is much similarity between the
economic history of France and that of Germany. It is not obvious at
all that there were significant basic differences with regard to the
entrepreneurial element in the two economies. In particular, one
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might think of Hoselitz's statement that the French entrepreneur
came to seek earlier and more assiduously than the British or the
American entrepreneur the relatively safe shelter of monopoly (page
304). Surely, German entrepreneurs were at least as eager to enter
into monopolistic compacts as their confreresinthe West. And yet
the fact remains that the Germany economy had been able to sustain
a high rate of industrial growth while the magnificent initial effort
in France, though not leading to stagnation at all, failed to produce
an equal rate. In any attempt to explain the slow rate of growth
in France comparisons with Germany present themselves almost in-
escapably. Once such comparisons are admitted, it is not too difficult
to draw up a list of accelerating factors that existed in Germany but
could not be found in France to any comparable extent, or, obversely,
a list of retarding factors in France that did not exist in Germany.
I doubt very much that differences in entrepreneurial behavior
would deserve a high rank on such a list, and I doubt even more that
such differences in entrepreneurial behavior as can be found are not
fairly explicable as the result of other differences, more funda-
mental and much less volatile, between the two economies.
Just because 1 believe that the entrepreneurial approach to eco-
nomic history has opened up new and profitable areas of research
I am fearful of attempts to overstress the role of the entrepreneurial
factor. It would be unfortunate if grave doubts were to be cast
upon the validity of the approach because it has proved unable to
support a weight of emphasis for which it was never designed.
Perhaps one final remark is in order. While the foregoing remarks
suggest the existence of some disagreement between Hoselitz and
myself, its extent should not be exaggerated. I feel that essentially
it is a question of a different distribution of emphasis. I fully ap-
preciate the fact that Hoselitz has written his paper within a
framework given by an assigned topic which in itself has forced
him to stress certain aspects of the development at the expense of
others.
E. P. REUBENS, The City College of New York
In his explanation of the differential growth of the British and
French economies, Hoselitz lays great stress on the different degrees
of economic intervention by the state in those two countries. He
presents France as a case of nearly arrested development involving
a paternalistic government and a persistently adolescent business
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class; while laissez-faire Britain is a picture of energetic, self-reliant
entrepreneurs turning the economic wheels faster and faster.
The conclusions drawn from these facts seem rather dubious. There
is much evidence that the contribution of the state to economic
growth may frequently be positive and even essential, and that in
any particular case the actual results depend very largely upon the
form and direction of state action.
Japan is an example of state promotion of economic growth, along
lines which appear to have been indispensable under then-existing
conditions and which certainly were crowned with substantial suc-
cess. The government pioneered industrial irmovations, subsidized
some private ventures in the earliest stages of a new industry (but
only in high-cost industries of strategic importance were subsidies
substantial and persistent), placed armament orders, provided social-
overhead capital, curtailed consumption by taxation, promoted pri-
vate saving and channeled that saving into industrial investment,
secured capital from abroad at a time when both direct investments
and private loans were virtually unobtainable, promoted and super-
vised industrial combinations, explored foreign markets, and so
forth. Not only did this paternalism succeed, but the system actually
was increasingly "privatized" as time went on (except in a few fields,
such as railways and steel). The kind of action the Japanese govern-
ment did not take was the primarily "protective" type: sustained
high tariffs, long-run domestic monopolies, extensive subsidization.
This is to say that the Japanese government avoided most of the
devices whose main effect is to protect inefficiency or to raise prices
without justification.
A somewhat similar record is revealed in the rise of modern
Germany. Even in the New World we must recognize the important
role of governments—especially state and local authorities—in pro-
viding social-overhead capital.
To explain Britain's rapid progress during the nineteenth century
without much government participation in economic activities—i.e.
at home, ignoring the vast colonial activities—more emphasis might
be placed on her head start, backed up by her favorable situation
in the circumstances of that era and stimulated by the profit inflations
flowing from wars and monetary expansion. The growth of France, in
contrast, seems to have been held back in considerable degree by
the difficulties of following closely behind the leader without an
equally favorable geographical and cultural environment, and also
by a concern for preserving a broad agricultural sector in the
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economyas well as an excessive reliance upon various forms of
protection for the new industrial sector.
Indeed, I would directly question Hoselitz's assumption that the
existence of an active government tends to produce passivity among
businessmen. In France it may have done SO; but the causation may
have run partly the other way: in the absence of an aggressive
entrepreneurial class the French government more and more had to
take over the functions of that class.
Under different circumstances the role of government may be
equally vital without moving in the same direction. Both Germany
and Japan indicate how an active, fostering governmental role is
conducive to rapid growth and a gradually widening sphere for
private business. Underdeveloped economies today, which appear to
need the fostering role of the state to a greater degree than was
usually the case in the past, face a choice not between state action
or none, but rather between the constructive and obstructive lines
of state action, in various degrees, of collaboration with private
enterprise.
HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON, Northwestern University
In setting out to answer the questions of how economic expansion
was financed in an underdeveloped United States and who were the
active agents in industrialization, Cochran has made a significant
contribution to the field of economic history. The part played by
American entrepreneurs in capital formation and economic growth
has been discussed piecemeal in a wide variety of publications, but
this represents a pioneer attempt to treat American economic de-
velopment around this central theme.
As a generalization the author suggests that "The role of the
entrepreneur ...isshaped by a combination of factors involving
personality types, cultural attitudes, technological knowledge, and
available physical resources" (page 340). The interrelations of these
four factors form the basis for his study of the role of American
entrepreneurs in capital development.
There is no question that at the beginning of the colonial period
the North American continent between the 25th and 49th parallels
offered abundant opportunities for economic development. As a
"backward area" vis-à-vis Western Europe the colonies had access
to the accumulated technical knowledge of an advanced economy.
While these characteristics were not to be found generally in other
380ENTREPRENEUR IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
parts of the world, they were not unique and in themselves do not
account for the remarkable economic expansion which followed. It
was their combination with particular personality types and cultural
attitudes that gave the American economy its distinguishing features.
In many respects the most interesting and significant part of the
paper reveals how personality types and cultural attitudes favorable
to active entrepreneurial participation in the economy emerged
early in the colonial period. A background and training in Europe
had prepared even the first colonizing adventurers to look for
effective ways of exploiting the resources of the New World. A
selective process which determined the types of individuals who
migrated brought a high percentage of actual or potential entre-
preneurs to the American colonies. Positions with the church, the
government, or the military which carried high prestige in the
mother country were largely absent from the colonial setting. The
result was the development of a cultural environment that not only
accepted but put a premium on "wealth-getting" as a means of
acquiring social status. In such an environment the entrepreneur, in
contrast with his position in many societies, was not considered
a deviant personality. In other words, there was "built into" the
American society a set of institutions or cultural values that ac-
cepted change as normal and rewarded the individuals who brought
it about.
Civen these conditions, the stage was set for the remarkable eco-
nomic growth that followed. Cochran illustrates in some detail how
extraordinarily ingenious successive generations of American busi-
nessmen were in expanding the supplies of capital funds by adapt-
ing old institutions or evolving new types. He calls attention in
passing to several questions, as yet unanswered, regarding certain
elements of the American scene that may have retarded capital
accumulation. The concluding section deals with a number of recent
changes in the environment that may have weakened the position
of the entrepreneur in the economy.
The only serious omission in this otherwise excellent description
and analysis of the motives for and methods employed in expanding
capital funds has to do with the reinvestment of earnings by Amer-
ican business. It is true that the growth of railroads and public
utilities in the nineteenth century required investment funds be-
yond the amounts that could be generated within individual con-
cerns, and that the growth of corporations in these fields began to
change the role of the entrepreneurs by the introduction of profes-
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sional managers and large groups of stockholders who had little,
if any, influence on management policies. It would be a mistake,
however, to become too preoccupied with this segment of the econ-
omy. In the fields of manufacturing, distribution, and marketing (not
to mention agriculture) the family-owned or closely held company
was predominant throughout the greater part of our history. The
nature and circumstance that prompted the great majority of these
organizations to meet their capital requirements out of earnings
should receive careful attention, not only for historical reasons but
also because much the same psychology seems to influence invest-
ment decisions in these fields even when stock ownership is widely
distributed and professional management is introduced.
As a matter of practical necessity Cochran confined his attention
largely to an analysis of the forces that affected the supply of capital.
In terms of economic growth, however, the question of the efficient
allocation of capital funds is of considerable significance. By raising
the questions regarding the effect on the supply of capital of mal-
adjustments between the demand for and supply of labor, sectional
and local rivalries, and the lack of security associated with certain
types of investments and particular regions, the author gives evidence
of imperfections in the organization of the capital markets. But this
topic should be developed further. More needs to be known about
the extent to which mobility of capital was affected by ignorance
and by barriers that were deliberately introduced. For example,
was the secrecy that surrounded business operations down to recent
times a factor that led to a large amount of reinvestment in firms
when capital might have been more productive elsewhere? How
much were banks influenced in their lending operations by tradition
which made itdifficult for different types of business to secure
accommodation? Answers to these and similar inquiries would give
a better understanding of how effectively capital funds were al-
located historically in the American economy.
These comments do not detract from the fact that insofar as the
economic historian fulfillshis function as "handmaiden" to the
economic theorist by presenting a careful and accurate account of
the evolution of a particular set of institutions, Cochran has dis-
charged his obligations in a highly competent fashion. But if the
purpose of this conference is to contribute to theoretical generaliza-
tions about capital formation, it is pertinent to ask what conclusions
may be drawn at this level from his paper. Why, for example,
was he assigned a topic which carries the implication, in its title at
382ENTREPRENEUR IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
least, that the entrepreneur was important in American capital
formation?
Perhaps the key to any broad conclusion that may be drawn from
the paper lies in the generalization advanced regarding the factors
that combine to affect the role of the entrepreneur. It may be as-
sumed from the examination of the American experience that there
are four "necessary" (but not sufficient, each by itself) conditions if
entrepreneurs are to play an active role in capital formation and eco-
nomic growth. These are the "right kind" of personality types, the
right kind of cultural attitudes, technological knowledge, and access
to physical resources, all of which were coexistent in the American
scene from early in the colonial period.
The very juxtaposition of these factors makes it difficult, how-
ever, to evaluate the role of the entrepreneur in American develop-
ment. To the extent that the social environment imposed few
obstacles to change, his role was much less significant than if re-
sistance had been strong. In fact, given this kind of an environment,
it would not be important to study the entrepreneur except as an
agent in the mechanism that resulted in change. The opposite point
of view would assume that the entrepreneur was a positive force,
constantly struggling to introduce new production functions and
attempting to modify institutions in the face of inertia or active op-
position. He would thus assume the key role in bringing about
economic development.
To pose the problem in this fashion comes dangerously close to
asking whether the social environment creates the entrepreneurs
or the entrepreneurs create the social environment. The purpose is
not to push the argument to such extremes. It is rather to call atten-
tion to the importance of determining the relative independence
and dependence of each of these two factors in economic growth. A
satisfactory answer would go a long way toward establishing a basis
for an acceptable theory of capital formation and economic de-
velopment.
LELA.w H. JENKS, Wellesley College
It is significant, I think, that both Hoselitz's and Cochran's papers
have a good deal more to say about entrepreneurs and their social
milieus than about capital formation. There is a good deal in Coch-
ran's about factors affecting capital allocation, but that isnot
necessarily the same thing as capital formation. This emphasis may
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be inherent in the entrepreneurial approach to long-run economic
changes. As I see it, the greatest common factor unifying such an
inquiry is the assumption that a general theory of society_specifi-
cally, some sort of sociology of change—is necessary to account for
economic development. The economic data alone do not enable us
to understand how people can respond differently to identical stimuli.
Accordingly, "entrepreneurship" symbolizes a good deal more than
the actions of one or more businessmen. It symbolizes an unde-
terrnined range of considerations—largely outside the purview of
static models—which also impinge on the decisions of businessmen,
including their decisions to be businessmen.
Cochran explicitly assumes a Schumpeterian entrepreneur who
introduces innovations in the production function, which involve
(in Schumpeter's words) "a non-negligible outlay of capital." The
essential function of entrepreneurship, then, is capital allocation
along lines involving novelty (hence also "uncertainty"?). But I
think that Cochran should make clear that this sort of operation does
not determine unambiguously either the direction or the amount
of economic change for a given society. It should be pointed out
frankly to a group interested in measurement that in terms of an
entrepreneurial approach thereisnothing remotely resembling
equivalence between inputs and outputs. For the economy as a
whole, for instance, innovation may emerge as capital-saving. Thus
our explanatory schemes must not be thought of, even surreptitiously,
as introducing a principle of conservation of effort; neither should
they be criticized or apologized for as falling short of such a
standard in their demonstrations.
Doubtless I was supposed to make reference to capital migration.
In Cochran's paper British capital figures as a means employed by
financial entrepreneurs in the United States to enable them to
carry forward new enterprises. At least in this context a restricted
meaning for capital is used—something like monetary capital or pur-
chasing power.
I am not so sure of Hoselitz's position. As a matter of fact, he
virtually ignores these same railroad bonds and their counterparts in
fifty other countries in speaking of British growth. Hoselitz defines
economic growth in terms of national income and seeks in entre-
preneurship an explanation of the fact that Great Britain has out-
run France. Now we know that in the generation before World
War I—to go no further—a substantial part of British investment
income was derived from such things as American railroad bonds,
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rubber plantations in Malaya, and so on. (There had been prior
capital allocation to these countries, by financial, commercial, or
industrial entrepreneurs, or all three, almost always resident in
Great Britain.) There was simply nothing comparable in the case
of France. The dimensions of this overseas activity were such that
it cannot be regarded as irrelevant to any measure of British eco-
nomic growth, but especially not to national income.
We might ask, Without her overseas economic empire would
Britain have run ahead of France? So stated, an answer would have
to be speculative. What we can be sure of is that only analytically,
not historically, can British economic growth in the nineteenth cen-
tury be limited to the British Isles. Even if we were to include what
has been passed over (for of course Hoselitz is not ignorant of these
matters),• we could still look for differences between France and
Great Britain in entrepreneurship. But the factors which Hoselitz
stresses so heavily to account for French backwardness—government
• patronageand powerful financial sponsorship—are elements which
have also been conspicuous in British enterprise overseas. Itis
curious that Hoselitz notes capital migration when he is talking about
France and the British who helped start things there, but omits it
in discussing British economic growth.
One could move on from here to comment on a strain of nostalgia
in both papers, and their marked ambivalence as to the consequences
of bigness. But this is enough to suggest that we are still a long way
in this entrepreneurial approach from being sure that some of our
statements will not be as true if we turn them upside down.
I must say that I concur wholly with Cochran's suggestion that
we think of entrepreneurship as part of a process which itself under-
goes change in time, and with his further suggestion that "growth
depended more on where and how capital was invested than on the
absolute quantity of voluntary savings..." (page372).
REPLY BY BEJIT F. HOSELITZ
I wish to express my appreciation for the very penetrating critical
comments by Gerschenkron, Reubens, and Jenks. In part they place
emphasis on points insufficiently underlined or entirely omitted in my
paper, and in part they direct attention to portions of the argument
which need to be sharpened or further elaborated. Above all, I must
thank Gerschenkron for having supplied a number of facts which
were badly neglected in my paper. I want to support fully his empha-
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sison the noticeable decline in economic regimentation during the
last few decades of the ancien régime; on the fact that Napoleon's
policies, and even those of the Directoire, represent a return to
much earlier practice; on the constraints imposed on the Restora-
tion government due to its political weakness; and on the strong
impetus given to French economic development through the liberal-
izing tendencies of the government of Napoleon III.
The most rapid advances in French industrial history were prob-
ably made in the last halves of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, periods in which liberal tendencies were relatively strongest
in France. But even in these periods French growth rates do not
seem to have reached those of Britain in its best decades. Although
"the scarcity of capital under specific conditions of backwardness"
(another factor stressed by Gerschenkron) can be made accountable
for this failure, France did engage in large-scale financing of foreign
governments and enterprises at a time when—measured by British
standards—considerable expansion of the domestic capital plant
would have been possible. Even if great weight can be attributed
to the factors mentioned by Gerschenkron, there is need to explain
why repeated relapses into relative stagnation occurred in France
and why a sustained period of growth commensurate with that in
Britain, Germany, or the United States is absent.'
1Thereis only one factual point raised by Gerschenkron with which I cannot
agree, and that is the difference in per capita incomes in England and France
at the end of the eighteenth century.I believe England's superiority to
have been substantially greater than 10 per cent. In support of this view I
cite three pieces of evidence: (1) Cohn Clark (The Conditions of EconomiO
Progress, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 71 and 80) computed British
and French annual incomes per head of working population and expressed them
in International Units. For the first decade of the nineteenth century he obtains
an annual income per worker of 566 to 584 I.U. in Britain and of 248 I.U. in
France. (2) Arthur Young, who was an acute and experienced observer, de-
clared that in France "those who lived on agricultural labor, and they were
the greatest number, were 76 per cent as well off as in England" (cited in
Eugene Gaudemet, L'abbd Galiani et la question du commerce des blés a la
fin du rdgne de Louis XV, Paris, Arthur Rousseau, 1899, p. 75). (8) If we con-
vert Henry Beeke's estimate (Observations on the Product of the Income Tax,
etc., London, J. Wright, 1800, pp. 126 and 186) of approximately £170 million
into francs, we obtain (at the rate of 21 francs per pound) an English national
income in 1798/1799 equal to approximately 3,570 million francs, whereas, in
1800, French national income was estimated at 5,402 million francs (cited in
Income and Wealth, Series III, Milton Gilbert, editor, Cambridge, Eng., Bowes
& Bowes for International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 1953,
p. 53). With a population inEngland of approximately 9.5 million and a popula-
tion in France of about 27 million, these figures yield an average income of 375
francs in England and of 200 francs in France.
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In addition to rectifying the factual historical record, Gerschen-
kron also touches upon a fundamental sociological problem, the
place of the factor of entrepreneurship in a historical explanation of
economic processes. It is extremely tempting to engage in a full-
scale examination of this question, but its magnitude would require
a full-length paper, at least. Nevertheless, because of its central im-
portance, and because some of Jenks' and Reubens' remarks deal
with this problem, I shall explain the sociological assumptions on
which my paper is based. Gerschenkron expresses the view that
entrepreneurs are likely to play the role of the dependent rather
than the independent variable in attempts to construct models of
economic development (page 876). I fully agree with this view-
point, and I believe that close reading of my paper will reveal that
it was written with this conception in mind. At the end of the
introductory section I point to the influence exerted by legal and
political institutions on entrepreneurial activity. In discussing the
development of eitrepreneurship in Britain, I stress the nature of
the internal political balance in seventeenth century England, the
fact that certain important developments affecting capital mobiliza-
tion and technical guidance of new enterprises became possible
because these enterprises developed on the periphery. Again, I
show how the openness of the social structure in Britain was a de-
termining factor in entrepreneurship and how later, through the
influence of rich returns from overseas investment and the accumula-
tion of large amounts of capital, the original vigor of British entre-
preneurs appears to have subsided.
If I understand my critics correctly, the problems at issue are
essentially two: (1) Granted that entrepreneurship is a dependent
variable, what is the precise nature of its relation to other variables
that exert an influence on the pace of development? and (2) What
influence do various forms of government control and guidance Of
industry exert on the number, independence, ahd self-assertiveness
of entrepreneurs?
I shall take up the second point first. Although some views on
this, as well as on the first question, are implicit in my paper, I did
not intend to provide a full answer for either. Above all, I did not in-
tend to compare the relative efficacy of government action and
action by private individuals in achieving a high level èf economic
development. What I did mean to show was how certain forms of
government regulation tend to retard rather than further economic
growth in an institutional environment in which primary reliance
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forthe guidance of investment is placed on private entrepreneurs.
The examples of Russian, Japanese, and German experience, there-
fore, do not disprove my contention but point to the need of dis-
tinguishing between types of government intervention which impede
the development of private enterprise, which do not impede it, and
which are neutral. Let us consider, for example, the case of Imperial
Germany, which is cited by Gerschenkron and Reubens as an ex-
ample in contradiction of my general viewpoint.
Our appraisal of the influence which the German government
exerted on German industry may be somewhat colored by our in-
terpretation of the over-all character of its politics. There is no
doubt that of all modern capitalist governments the German, and
before it the Prussian, were the most authoritarian and the most
paternalistic in relation to 'the individual citizen. On the surface
this would lead one to assume that the German government also
exerted the strongest regulatory influence on industry. But I believe
that this was by no means the case. There is no necessary connection
between absolutism in the exercise of political power and full-scale
government control of economic affairs. The governments of Prussia
and pre-1914 Germany were, on the whole, rather liberal in economic
affairs and, so far as I can see, interfered little to prevent the full
development and aggressive assertion of private entrepreneurship.
The German government tried, of course, to carry out an economic
policy. Bismarck even passed labor and social insurance laws which
were regarded as anathema by the more doctrinaire liberals of the
time. But there is a vast difference between a set of economic policies
which merely determine the external framework within which private
entrepreneurial action is possible and the more direct intervention
in industrialization processes which was characteristic of pre-revolu-
tionary France. Unlike the latter, the German government supplied
rules for the game but did not take the cards away from the players
in order to deal its own hand.
There are still other factors in the socio-economic picture of pre-
1914 Germany which exerted an influence on entrepreneurial action,
chief among them the somewhat ambiguous social position of
businessmen between a landholding but largely impoverished aris-
tocracy and a professional lower-middle class with status aspirations
far beyond its economic importance. It would lead us too far astray
to discuss these factors in detail. But the fact that their presence
388ENTREPRENEUR IN AMERICAN CAPITAL FORMATION
in Germany cannot be disputed makes me wonder whether anal-
ogous variables may not be discernible in Russia and Japan.2
The problem of the precise nature of the relation between the
variable "entrepreneurship" and other variables which exert an in-
fluence on the pace and direction of economic growth seems to
be central to Cerschenkron's remarks. He thinks that I overstressed
the role of the entrepreneurial factor and underemphasized other
factors. In particular he cites the example of pre-1914 Germany and
the emergence of the Saint-Simonian entrepreneurs around the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century in France.
Gerschenkron and I are agreed that this emergence constitutes a
break with the past. The main issue is the explanation of the sudden
appearance of these men. Cerschenkron finds my explanation in-
adequate. His criticism, however, attributes a view to me which I
do not hold. He says that I was "entitled to expect that the last
sparks of entrepreneurial strength had been successfuily extinguished
between 1815 and 1850" (page 876), and that, on the basis of this
assumption, the emergence of the Saint-Simonians was indeed a
"strange accident." Apparently, I expressed myself so clumsily that
even as acute and well-informed a reader as Gerschenkron could
be misled. I did not say, nor did I imply, that entrepreneurship
was killed under Napoleon I and his Bourbon successors. In par-
ticular, I believe that it could be shown that in the field of financial'
talent there was an unbroken line from Jacques Coeur and the
moneymen of the Lyons exchange in the sixteenth century, via the
more eminent tax-farmers and men like Law and Necker, to the
bankers of the "old school," and finally to the brothers Pereire. And
I referred to "historical necessity" because I felt that the new
impetus in the 1850's came from the money side rather than from
industry, and that this was quite in the line of French entrepreneurial
traditions and in profound contrast to those of Britain.
But in order to supply a fuller explanation of the problem, of which
the Saint-Simonian episode is merely an example, and in order
to purge myself of Gerschenkron's complaint that the sociological
theory underlying my exposition is too simple, I wish to add a few
remarks on two socio-psychological generalizations, which should,
2Thisfact also makes me suspect that the "privatization" of the Japanese
economy did not proceed so smoothly or, indeed, so far as Reubens claims. I
base this opinion too on a recently published paper by Marion J. Levy, Jr.,
"Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, October 1953, pp. 161-197.
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perhaps,have been stated explicitly in my paper in order to avoid
misunderstandings. I will state them rather categorically since a
full discussion of these complex relations would lead far beyond
the space at my disposal. Some further elucidation of these thoughts
may be found in my paper on "Entrepreneurship and Economic
Growth."3
The first proposition is that it is probably incorrect to speak of
entrepreneurship as a homogeneous phenomenon. One must dis-
tinguish different forms of entrepreneurship depending upon the
general institutional environment—notably, the degree of govern-
mental guidance of and interference in the economy—and upon the
nature of the business in which entrepreneurs are engaged. I believe
that an important difference exists between industrial entrepreneurs,
on the one hand, and financial and commercial entrepreneurs, on
the other. The differences between the groups of entrepreneurs is
due mainly to three factors, two of which have general applicability
and the third of which has special relevance for Western European
countries. The first is that, ceteris paribus, investment in industry is
riskier than investment in finance or trade, since the invested capital
turns over more slowly and is more specifically tied to supplying a
particular market. Second, the industrial entrepreneur, at least in
the early stages of industrialization, must possess not only talent for
business but often also technological knowledge and skills and a
greater genius for leading men in a joint task than a merchant or
financier. And finally, in the countries of Western Europe entrepre-
neurship in trade and finance has much deeper roots and longer-
lasting traditions than that in industry. This means that the social
position of financiers and merchants is less ambiguous than that
of industrialists, that time-honored codes exist for the one group
which are absent for the other, and that entrepreneurs in finance and
commerce can build upon acquired privileges which only slowly
were extended to, and sometimes even had to be fought for by,
industrialists.
On the basis of these reflections I think that Britain, in which
independent industrialentrepreneurship developed earlier and
throughout played a more forceful role, shows a more profound
social-structural change away from medieval antecedents than
France. In part this was probably due to the greater weakness of
entrepreneurial institutions in medieval Britain than in France. But
whatever the reasons, the victory of modern capitalism was more
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, October 1952, pp. 97-110.
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complete in Britain than in France, which continued until late in
the nineteenth century to show features in its economic ideology
which are reminiscent of a precapitalist system of values. An im-
portant aspect of this difference appears to me to be the more ag-
gressive entrepreneurial spirit in Britain and with it the more suc-
cessful exploitation of economic possibilities as they became availa-
ble with the progress of science and technology.
In this paper, as well as at various places in my original essay,
I have made reference to traditions in entrepreneurial behavior and
norms. My second general proposition relates to this problem:
Among the variables affecting entrepreneurial activity, past entre-
preneurial performance and traditions of entrepreneurship occupy
an important place. Though the proposition may sound tautological
in this formulation, its full implication becomes clear if we consider
its corollary: Since rigorous norms of entrepreneurial action often
develop in a country with long traditions of entrepreneurship, any
reorientation of entrepreneurial behavior must overcome not merely
external obstacles (e.g. scarcity of capital, absence of a regular,
disciplined industrial labor force, etc.) but also those intrinsic
obstacles which may be imposed by the existing traditions among
enterprisers. In order for new forms of entrepreneurial attitudes to
develop, an overwhelming challenge must exist which the old forms
are unable to meet. Industrial entrepreneurship, as distinct from
entrepreneurship in trade and finance, demanded such new attitudes,
and hence only rarely attained full-scale development. In fact,
outside the Anglo-Saxon countries and possibly those regions of the
Continent which came under the lasting influence of Calvinism or
other dissenting Protestant sects, vigorous, independent industrial
entrepreneurship hardly developed.
The relationship between Protestantism and the development of
the "spirit of capitalism" was, of course, first explained by Max
Weber. As is well known, a long controversy ensued in which some
of Weber's opponents repeatedly emphasized the capitalist spirit and
behavior of medieval merchants, notably in the cities of northern
Italy. I believe that some of the disputes over points in Weber's
thesis result from his failure to draw a sharp distinction between
mercantile and financial capitalism, on the one hand, and industrial
capitalism, on the other. If we make this distinction—and we should
make it, simply because medieval commercial and financial "capital-
ism" encountered limitations in its growth potentialities which only
• modern industrialization overcame successfully—the importance of
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theCalvinist ethic appears to have been not in having created a
"spirit of capitalism" as such, but rather in having contributed to
its generalization among all classes and in having altered profound-
ly, in this manner, existing traditions and norms of entrepreneurial
behavior. This process went furthest in ,Britain, Holland, and the
countries colonized by British and Dutch settlers. It was much less
conspicuous in France, and the persecution and final expulsion of
the Huguenots were measures which enhanced the rigidities and
relative "backwardness" of entrepreneurial thinking and action in
France,
In the course of French economic development there were, of
course, a number of turning points in which the old entrepreneurial
traditions could have been broken and replaced by new ones. One
such turning point was the beginning of the rule of Napoleon III.
Another was the conclusion of the religious wars in the reign of
Henry IV. At that time the hegemony of the financiers was rein-
forced; the industrialists were clearly pushed into the back seat,
and, as if to impress upon them their political and social impotence,
they were taken under the tutelage of the government. I began
my account with the religious wars and their outcome because it
appeared to me that the system created by Laffemas and Sully and
their contemporaries constitutes an important factor influencing the
traditions of French entrepreneurship.
This, then, in a sketchy and perhaps overly abbreviated form, is
my "sociology," if it deserves that name. I thought that I could omit
any extended discussion of this problem in my paper because I did
not consider it my task to write an economic history of Britain and
France within which the factor of entrepreneurship had to be
"explained" and placed "into its proper perspective." I preferred
to discuss, instead, the relationship between the forms of entre-
preneurship actually realized in each country and the general im-
pact of entrepreneurship on capital formation and economic growth.
For this reason I believe also that I need not discuss in detail the
alternative explanation for the different growth rates of Britain and
France tentatively suggested by Reubens. But I do wish to say that
his interpretation appears to be impossible to prove and is stated
in such general terms as to be of little use as an explanation. He says
that Britain had a head start, that this head start was "stimulated
by the profit inflations flowing from wars and monetary expansion,"
that France seems to have been "held back...bythe difficulties
of following closely behind the leader without an equally favorable
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geographical and cultural environment...." Butwhat matters, above
all, is to explain why Britain had a head start, or rather why she
got to the top in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. I believe that the differences in entrepreneurship go a
long way toward such an explanation. Moreover, France experienced
a profit inflation from wars and monetary expansion, just as did
Britain. And I can see no reason why France's following closely
behind Britain should be a special handicap. It is significant, how-
ever, that as time went on, France fell more and more behind
and in the nineteenth century was overtaken by Germany and
the United States. Finally, I agree with Reubens that the geographi-
cal and cultural environments were of great importance in the
slowness of France's development, especially the latter. But by
drawing attention to these factors we have not really explained the
difference in growth rates. In discussing entrepreneurship I have
selected an aspect—and, as I believe, an important aspect—of the
"cultural environment" and have attempted to trace its form and
impact through the decisive periods of the economic development
of the two countries.
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THE INFLUENCE OF ENTERPRISE
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES